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Abstract
This paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when
both face a tax-bankruptcy trade-off. Full ownership is optimal when the first unit has
positive debt, because dividends help avoid its default. Positive debt is, in turn, optimal
when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold, and/or thin capitalization rules place an
upper limit on the debt level in the second unit, and/or the Volcker Rule bans bailout
transfers to the second unit. Full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on
intercorporate dividend. This theory rationalizes observations on multinationals, financial
conglomerates, and family groups.
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1. Introduction
Shareholders in control of multiple units may directly own equity in each of them. This
gives rise to a horizontal group, an organization that family firms sometimes adopt (Masulis,
Pham, and Zein, 2011). Groups are instead hierarchical when the controlling investors
indirectly own the shares of one unit through another unit. Outside investors may buy
minority stakes in affiliates of a hierarchical group, giving rise to pyramidal groups (La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999), but this is not the rule. For instance, parent companies
in multinational groups often fully own their subsidiaries (Lewellen and Robinson, 2013).
One trait of units connected through common control is their reliance on debt financing
(Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me, 2008; Kolasinski, 2009; Masulis, Pham, and Zein, 2011).
Sometimes the parent unit raises most of the debt, while in other instances other units —
such as the leveraged buy out (LBO) targets — bear all the debt burden.
This paper sets out to explain the ownership and capital structure of two connected units
that share a common controlling entity. We call them “units” instead of firms or banks,
because in our model, as in Leland (2007), there is no explicit production or intermediation
activity and hence no real synergy. The controlling entity initially owns the stochastic cash
flows from the two activities. It maximizes their value, net of corporate taxes, choosing
whether to own them directly in a horizontal group, or indirectly in a hierarchical group
where one unit, the parent, owns a share of the other unit, the subsidiary. A dividend flows
to the parent in proportion to its equity share in the subsidiary. The dividend also depends
on the level and the cost of debt, both of which we determine together with ownership. As
in trade-off theory, debt provides a tax shield because its interest is deductible from the
corporate income. At the same time, higher debt increases the expected default costs.
Our first result is that the value-maximizing ownership of units is hierarchical, with a
levered parent company that owns 100% of its subsidiary shares. This result holds for any
combination of tax and default cost parameters. This hierarchical arrangement dominates
both horizontal and pyramidal groups in which the parent owns less than 100% of the shares,
because the entire subsidiary dividend flows to the parent before eventually reaching ultimate
shareholders. Dividends can thus help the parent repay its own debt, allowing it to better
exploit the tax shield.
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This ownership result refers, however, to a special case that overlooks the presence of
formal guarantees and informal bailout of affiliates in both industrial and financial groups (see
Bodie and Merton, 1992; Herring and Carmassi, 2009, respectively). Our general analysis
therefore allows the parent company to support its profitable but insolvent affiliate as long
as both of them survive (as in Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993; Luciano and Nicodano,
2014). In this enlarged model, debts in the two units become substitutes due to the interplay
of ownership and bailout connections. Higher parent debt reduces the level of parent cash
flows that remains available for the bailout of the affiliate, leading to lower optimal subsidiary
debt and tax shield. Vice versa, higher subsidiary debt reduces the dividend transfer to the
parent and, in turn, optimal parent leverage and tax shield.
Our main result is that full ownership of subsidiary shares remains value maximizing if
the income tax rate of the parent company is high enough to induce the parent company to
reduce its tax burden through leverage. Value is instead insensitive to subsidiary ownership
when the parent company tax rate is small enough so that zero leverage is optimal. Such
zero-leverage unit can equally be a proper parent of a fully owned subsidiary, a proper parent
in a pyramidal group or a unit in a horizontal group (that we will anyway call the “parent”).
The parent gives up its tax savings to provide maximal support to the levered connected
unit. This ownership irrelevance result is hard to reconcile with the typical trade-off intuition
that leads to interior optimal leverage instead of the concentration of all group debt in the
subsidiary. The result derives from endogenous debt pricing and costly default. As debt
increases, the default probability grows, inducing a higher tax-deductible interest spread. At
the same time, the deadweight cost of default is mitigated by bailout transfers. Such positive
feedback from higher default probability to higher tax savings explains the possibility of total
debt shifting onto the subsidiary.
Extant theories of connected units determine internal ownership, assuming the extraction
of private benefits from control (Zingales, 1995; Chemmanur and John, 1996; Almeida and
Wolfenzon, 2006). Ours relies on the idea that an internal dividend helps support upstream
units while preserving them from contagion. We thus contribute a new insight on the role
of full subsidiary ownership while highlighting the distortions deriving from taxes. Prior
structural models of leverage in connected units assume exogenous ownership, setting it equal
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to 100%. In one case (Leland, 2007) the focus is on the merger. In the second case (Luciano
and Nicodano, 2014) the analysis highlights the benefits of the bailout mechanism. There, the
dividend payout is set to zero, leading to zero optimal parent leverage, always. Our results
explain why parent companies often fully own their subsidiaries in both US multinationals
(Lewellen and Robinson, 2013) and European groups (Bloch and Kremp, 2001). The latter
also display higher leverage than their subsidiaries (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Faccio and
Lang, 2002), especially when they receive larger dividend payments (De Jong et al., 2012).
So far the model only considers income taxes, for consistency with prior capital struc-
ture literature. However, regulatory authorities restrict group activities because of either
governance (Kandel et al., 2015), or tax (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, 2016) or financial stability (Herring and Carmassi, 2009) motives. Our structural
model allows to infer how group-specific rules impact ownership, leverage, default costs and
taxes.
We therefore enrich the tax-bankruptcy trade-off by first considering intercorporate div-
idend taxes (IDT) that weigh on internal dividends, on top of the taxes on distributions to
ultimate shareholders. We show when the obligation to pay IDT makes partial, or even zero,
ownership optimal, possibly augmenting the wedge between ownership and control. This
can occur even with a negligible IDT tax rate.
Next, we model thin capitalization (TC) rules that place an upper bound on the debt level
of the subsidiary in hierarchical groups. An ownership mutation into a horizontal structure
avoids these rules when they are not enforced in each guaranteed unit, provided that the
parent tax rate is low. Otherwise, TC rules break ownership irrelevance and always lead
to full subsidiary ownership. In this case, debt shifting onto the parent company partially
mitigates the impact of TC rules on the tax burden.
Finally, we observe that our initial analysis without bailouts replicates the effects of
the so-called Volcker Rule that prohibits banks from supporting a subsidiary special purpose
vehicle (SPV). While the bailout prohibition should intuitively reduce default costs, we show
that a combination of IDT and the Volcker Rule can increase them, despite lowering optimal
debt, because IDT damage the only remaining internal support channel — the one based
on internal dividends. On the contrary, a combination of IDT and TC rules can contain
3
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default costs by limiting tax distortions while leaving the bailout channel at work. These
last results underline that taxes determine financial stability through not only debt levels
but also internal transfers.
These additional results can also explain some contrasting ownership features of con-
nected units across countries. In the EU, groups are hierarchical, consistent with the fact
that EU tax authorities do not tax internal dividends. In the US, on the contrary, inter-
corporate dividends are subject to taxes unless parent ownership exceeds a high threshold.
Accordingly, evidence on family ownership (Villalonga and Amit, 2009; Masulis, Pham, and
Zein, 2011) shows that direct control via a horizontal structure is more common. Other
model implications remind aspects of the private equity industry. Like the parent company
in our ownership irrelevance proposition, the private equity fund, which may enjoy a special
tax status, issues no debt and controls its leveraged portfolio firms, at times contributing
to their debt restructurings. Tax savings in the LBO deals contribute to value creation
(Acharya et al., 2013; Kaplan, 1989), as in our results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to the related literature;
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal internal ownership and
leverage choices. Section 5 generalizes the trade-off to IDT, highlighting its interaction with
TC and no bailout provisions. Section 6 summarizes some relevant stylized facts. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2. Related literature
This paper contributes to the theory of corporate ownership. Previous models determine
the ownership share of minority shareholders, assuming that the controlling entity extracts
private benefits from control. In Zingales (1995), the separation of ownership from control,
through a pyramid or an alternative mechanism, strengthens the bargaining power of the
controlling entity in future control negotiations. Chemmanur and John (1996) study the
joint design of debt and ownership of two projects. When the controlling entity has limited
wealth, it uses both separate incorporation and debt financing of the subsidiary to protect
private benefits from control. In Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Almeida et al. (2011),
the controlling entity prefers a direct purchase, without any involvement of minority share-
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holders, of higher NPV units. It employs instead a listed parent to acquire lower NPV units,
as this method uses the parent’s retained earnings that partly belong to minority sharehold-
ers. Our analysis sets private benefits to zero, allowing for positive default costs instead,
to shift the attention away from minority shareholders and onto lenders. The parent share
of subsidiary dividends, and its role in preventing costly default, is the new aspect of own-
ership we bring to the foreground. Following this insight we offer a new rationale for both
hierarchical groups (with full or partial subsidiary ownership by the parent) and horizontal
groups, depending on the tax-bankruptcy trade-off.
This insight advances the understanding of complex organizations, such as multinationals.
Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicode`me (2008) show that a change in the tax treatment of an
affiliate prompts a change in the leverage of all multinational affiliates. This implication
carries over to our model, which adds the following three. First, a change in the tax treatment
of an affiliate also modifies the ownership share so as to enhance tax savings. For instance,
debt shifting toward the parent, due to an increase in its own tax rate or to the introduction
of either TC or no bailout rules, will increase the parent ownership share. Second, ownership
taxes exert non-linear effects on leverage. Thus, the introduction of IDT shifts debt towards
the subsidiary when it generates a pyramid, while perhaps leaving debt unchanged when it
dismantles the pyramid as in Morck (2005). Third, the concentration of debt in one affiliate
is possible. Due to the endogenous pricing, higher debt increases tax savings not only directly
but also indirectly through a rise in the tax-deductible interest spread.1
Our model innovates with respect to previous structural models of leverage that assume
exogenous ownership. They explain that a merger allows for both a higher debt and a higher
tax shield, with respect to stand-alone units, because its diversified segments support each
other. However, the contagion costs can offset the gains stemming from the tax shield when
cash flow correlation is moderate (Leland, 2007). This is why a zero-leverage parent that
supports its wholly-owned subsidiary exploits both the tax shield and diversification while
avoiding contagion thanks to limited liability (Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). Our paper
1 We are able to study how the enriched trade-off shapes ownership by fixing payout, investment, and
equity issues. Prior research analyzes the effect of personal dividend taxes on the dividend payout, invest-
ment, and equity issues (see Chetty and Saez, 2010, and references therein), fixing instead ownership and
group-specific taxation.
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shows that, with endogenous ownership and positive dividend payout, this zero-leverage
result implies ownership irrelevance and obtains for low parent tax rates as long as there are
no TC rules and bailout prohibitions. Otherwise, the parent company has positive optimal
debt and both dividends and bailouts permit diversification without contagion. Thus, our
paper provides a general trade-off theory of ownership and capital structure.
3. The model
This section describes our set up, which follows Leland (2007) in modeling endogenous
leverage and bankruptcy costs. We begin with the case of unconnected units and then
provide details on internal ownership and bailouts.
At time zero, a controlling entity owns two units, i = P, S. Each unit has a random
operating cash flow Xi that is realized at time T . We denote with G(·) the cumulative
distribution function and with f(·) the density2 of Xi, identical for the two units; g(·, ·) is
the joint distribution of XP and XS, and ρ is their correlation. At time zero, the controlling
entity selects the face value Fi of the zero-coupon risky debt to issue in each unit so as to
maximize the total arbitrage free value (νPS) of equity, Ei, and debt, Di:
νPS = max
FP ,FS
∑
i=P,S
(Ei +Di) . (1)
Each unit pays a flat proportional income tax at an effective rate 0 < τi < 1 and suffers
proportional dissipative costs 0 < αi < 1, in the case of default.
3 Interest on debts are
deductible from taxable income. The presence of a tax advantage for debt generates a trade-
off for the unit: on the one hand, increased leverage results in tax benefits, while on the
other, it leads to higher expected default costs since — everything else being equal — a
highly levered unit is more likely to default.
At time T , cash flows are distributed after the payment of both corporate income taxes
and debt obligations. A unit is declared insolvent when it cannot meet its debt obligations.
Its income, net of the deadweight loss due to default costs, is distributed first to the tax
2As a technical assumption, we require that the density is unimodal.
3No tax credits or carry forwards are permitted.
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authority and then to the lenders. Maximizing the value of debt and equity for the inital
owner is equivalent to minimizing the cash flows lost in the form of taxes (Ti) or of default
costs (Ci):
νPS = min
FP ,FS
∑
i=P,S
Ti + Ci. (2)
The expected tax burden of each unit is proportional to the expected taxable income, i.e.
to the operational cash flow Xi, net of the tax shield X
Z
i . In turn, the tax shield coincides
with interest deductions, which are equal to the difference between the nominal value of debt
Fi, and its market value Di: X
Z
i = Fi −Di.
It is useful to start with the benchmark case of unconnected, stand-alone units. The
expected tax burden in each stand-alone (SA) unit is equal to
T iSA(Fi) = τiφE[(Xi −XZi )+], (3)
where the expectation is computed under the risk neutral probability, and φ is the discount
factor (see Leland, 2007). The superscripts and subscripts, i, indicate whether the stand-
alone unit is endowed with the parent (i = P ) or subsidiary (i = S) parameters.
Each stand-alone unit defaults when its net cash flow is lower than the face value of
debt; in other words, default occurs when the level of its realized cash flow is lower than the
default threshold, Xdi = Fi +
τi
1−τiDi. Default costs, which are a deadweight loss, are equal
to
CiSA(Fi) = αiφE
[
Xi1{0<Xi<Xdi }
]
. (4)
They increase in the default cost parameter, αi, as well as in (positive) realized cash flows
when the unit goes bankrupt. A rise in the nominal value of debt, Fi, increases the default
threshold, Xdi , thereby increasing the expected default costs.
It is possible to show that the tax shield of a stand-alone unit is a convex function of
Fi. Increasing the nominal value of debt increases the tax shield, thereby reducing the tax
burden because the market value of debt, Di, increases with Fi at a decreasing rate (reflecting
a higher risk). On the contrary, the default threshold Xdi is concave in the face value of debt,
Fi. Luciano and Nicodano (2014) prove that a stand-alone unit has positive optimal debt if
7
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the sum of tax burden and default costs is convex in the face value of debt. The appendix
shows that it raises positive debt even if the riskfree rate is zero, because of the endogenous
spread.
The following section allows for transfers between units that affect both the expected
default costs and the spread associated to a given level of debt.
3.1. Internal ownership and bailouts
This section provides details on linkages between units. We first model internal ownership
and bailout transfers that characterize complex organizations, allowing for IDT. Next, we
assess how the two links impact on both the tax burden and the default costs of the group,
given exogenous debt levels.
The parent owns a fraction, ω, of its subsidiary equity. When ω = 1, the parent fully
owns its subsidiary, giving rise to a hierarchical group. The controlling entity owns the
subsidiary only indirectly, a case that appears in the left-hand side of Fig. 1. When ω = 0,
there is no parent ownership. The controlling entity will either own the subsidiary directly
or will sell it to outside shareholders or both, as in the right-hand side of Fig. 1. This is the
case of a horizontal group. The intermediate case, where the connected units constitute a
pyramidal group, is a mix of parent, controlling and/or outside shareholding.4
The subsidiary distributes its profit after paying the tax authority and lenders, (XnS −
FS)
+, where XnS are its cash flows, net of corporate income taxes. Assuming a unit payout
ratio, the parent receives a share ω of the subsidiary profits at time T . Let the tax rate on
the intercorporate dividend be equal to 0 ≤ τD < 1. Consequently, the expected present
value of the after tax internal dividend is equal to
ID = φωE
[
(1− τD)(XnS − FS)+
]
. (5)
4 The controlling entity in this model has no role but the design of ownership and capital structure. It
can keep control without ownership, with tools used by families (see Villalonga and Amit, 2009), SPVs, and
private equity.
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Controlling  
entity 
Horizontal group (ω=0) 
Controlling  
entity 
Controlling  
entity 
Parent Parent “Parent” 
Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
Outsiders 
Partially owned  
subsidiary (0<ω<1) 
Fully owned 
subsidiary(ω=1) 
Fig. 1. The figure depicts the three organizations that our model can reproduce: a parent with its fully
owned subsidiary (left panel), a parent that partially owns its subsidiary (center panel), and a horizontal
group (right panel). Blue dotted lines represent the possible ownership links.
The cash flow available to the parent, after receiving the internal dividend, increases to
Xn,ωP = X
n
P + (1− τD)ω(XnS − FS)+. (6)
Eq. (6) indicates that internal dividends provide the parent with an extra buffer of cash that
can help it remain solvent in adverse contingencies in which it would default as a stand-alone
company. It follows that the dividend transfer generates an internal rescue mechanism whose
size increases in the parent ownership, ω, and falls in the dividend tax rate, τD, given the
capital structure. Eq. (6) highlights that internal flows are useful for avoiding the parent
company’s default, instead of serving for financing investment projects, as in Stein (1997).
We do not analyze personal dividend and capital gains taxation levied on ultimate share-
holders. Therefore, we assume that the positive personal dividend (and capital gains) tax
9
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rate is already included in τi, which is indeed an effective tax rate. We also assume that the
personal tax rate on distributions is equal across the parent and the subsidiary, so as to rule
out straightforward tax arbitrage between the two.
Another characteristic of connected units is the internal bailout, which we model following
Luciano and Nicodano (2014). The parent transfers cash flows to the other unit if the latter,
which is insolvent but profitable (0 < XnS < FS), becomes solvent thanks to the transfer
FS −XnS , while the parent remains solvent (XnP − FP ≥ FS −XnS ).5
As in Luciano and Nicodano (2014), there is limited liability of the parent unit with
respect to the debt of its subsidiary, even in the limiting case when the parent is the sole
owner of its subsidiary. Since neither dividends nor the bailouts affect the solvency of the
provider, they differ from both internal loans and unconditional guarantees that help the
recipient unit service its debt but impair the service of the giver’s debt. The model also
assumes that the assets of the subsidiary are subject to the claims of the parent lenders
should the parent default and if internal ownership is positive.6 Thus dividends (like loans
and unconditional guarantees) are not conditional on the parent survival, while bailouts are
contingent on positive subsidiary cash flows. This asymmetry implies that dividends are
costlier than bailouts, affecting the trade-off between parent and subsidiary debt. Clearly,
it is possible to model a zero dividend payout contingent on the parent default, making
dividends exactly symmetric to bailouts. However, we stick to an unconditional payout that
captures the ability of parent’s lenders to recover subsidiary profits through a revocatory
action.
We can now show how internal dividends and the bailout transfer affect default costs and
the tax burden of the group.
3.2. The tax-bankruptcy trade-off in complex organizations
This section amends the tax-bankruptcy trade-off for the presence of both the bailout
and internal dividends. Below we analyze their change given the debt levels, FP and FS,
5In a static model, the ex-post enforcement of bailouts must rely on courts. In practice, enforcement
mechanisms vary from reputation (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993) to the purchase of the junior
tranche by the sponsoring parent (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999).
6 See the case of the Ferruzzi Group restructuring described in Penati and Zingales (1997).
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that will become endogenous later on.
As in Luciano and Nicodano (2014), the bailout transfer never increases the default costs
in the subsidiary, CS, and it leaves both the default costs of the parent and the tax burden
of the group unaffected. The reduction in expected default costs (Γ) is equal to
Γ = CSSA(FS)− CS = αSφE
[
XS1{0<XS<XdS ,XP≥h(XS)}
]
≥ 0, (7)
where the indicator function 1{·} defines the set of states of the world in which the rescue
occurs, that is, when the subsidiary defaults without transfers (first term) and the parent
funds are sufficient for rescue (second term). The shape of the function h, which is defined
in the appendix, implies that the rescue by the parent is likelier the smaller the parent debt,
FP .
Dividends leave the subsidiary trade-off unchanged, affecting, however, both the default
costs and the tax burden of the parent. On the one hand, dividends add to the cash flow
in the parent — as in Eq. (6) — increasing the chances that the parent is solvent. On the
other hand, they also increase the lenders’ recovery rate in insolvency, should the parent
go bankrupt anyway. This last feature differentiates internal dividend transfers from the
bailout transfers described earlier. It captures the asymmetry of limited liability in groups,
which protects the parent from, but subjects the subsidiary to, the claims of the other unit
lenders.
Default costs saved by the parent, ∆C, are then equal to
∆C = CPSA(FP )− CP = αPφE
[
XP1{0≤XP<XdP ,XS≥k(XP )}
]
+
− αPφE
[
ω(1− τD)(XnS − FS)1{XP<XdP ,XS<k(XP )}
]
,
where k(XP ) is defined in the appendix. The first term measures the default costs saved
when the parent avoids insolvency, thanks to the dividend transfer. The second term equals
the default costs on the dividend, when it is insufficient to repay parent debt. Lemma 1 in the
appendix shows that ∆C, under our assumptions, is nonincreasing in FS and nondecreasing in
internal ownership. Indeed, both higher subsidiary debt and lower ownership share decrease
11
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the dividend transfer.
Finally, dividends increase the group tax burden above the one of stand-alone units
because of IDT. We denote this change as ∆T , defined as
∆T = TS + TP − T PSA(FP )− T SSA(FS) = φωτDE[(XnS − FS)+] ≥ 0. (8)
The simultaneous presence of bailout and dividend transfers originates a trade-off between
parent and subsidiary debt. The higher the subsidiary debt, the lower the dividends, given
the ownership share. Lower dividends result in higher default costs in the parent at each
level of debt. Similarly, increasing parent debt reduces subsidiary support in the subsidiary
through the bailout guarantee.7
4. Ownership and capital structure
This section determines the capital structure (FP and FS) and the internal ownership
share ω that minimize total default costs and tax burdens of the two units, solving
min
FS≥0,FP≥0,0≤ω≤1
TS + TP + CS + CP . (9)
Throughout the paper, we maintain the standard technical assumption of convexity of
the objective function. We report the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the minimum
program at the beginning of Appendix B. We denote the optimal debt levels and ownership,
solving Eq. (9), as F ∗S , F
∗
P , ω
∗. The value-maximizing organization can result in a hierarchical
group, ω∗ = 1, a pyramid 0 < ω∗ < 1, or a horizontal group, ω∗ = 0.
Section 4.1. presents the main theorem of this paper, assuming no IDT. The model al-
lows to compute several endogenous magnitudes, including taxes, the dividend and bailout
transfers, and the value of debt and equity—beyond the book value of debts and the owner-
ship share. A presentation of two numerical exercises, based on Leland (2007) calibration,
7The trade-off is sharpest if the payout can be set to zero when the parent defaults (in other words, if
the parent company lenders cannot file a revocatory action to recover their dividends). Savings in default
costs become nondecreasing in internal ownership for any density, and dividends become the mirror image
of bailouts.
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allows to appreciate the heterogeneity of optimal capital structure for units with the same
tax-bankruptcy parameters.
4.1. Optimal hierarchical groups
Let us first consider the optimal choice of ownership without bailouts. In this case, full
subsidiary ownership is optimal. In fact, stand-alone firms face default costs because they
always have positive optimal leverage (see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). The ownership
link improves the tax-bankruptcy trade-off by decreasing default costs in the parent, at the
stand-alone level of debt, without worsening the tax-bankruptcy trade-off in the subsidiary.
Theorem 1. No bailout.
Let there be no bailout and no IDT (τD = 0). Then (i) the optimal subsidiary ownership
is full (ω∗ = 100%), and the parent has positive leverage (F ∗P > 0); (ii) optimal debt in the
parent exceeds the one in a stand-alone unit (F ∗P > F
P∗
SA) when the condition (B.9) in the
appendix holds; and (iii) if the units are equal (τS = τP , σS = σP , αS = αP ), F
∗
P ≥ F P∗SA for
every ρ > ρ¯(τ, α, σ).
This theorem implies that internal dividends are value increasing. They allow the parent
company to raise additional debt relative to a comparable stand-alone unit under sufficient
conditions. Internal dividends potentially save a larger share of parent cash flow when both
its debt and the associated default threshold increase. However, the chances that the divi-
dend itself is insufficient to save the parent and that, as a consequence, it is lost in the default
of the parent, also increase in parent debt. The condition (B.9) in the appendix requires
that a marginal increase in parent debt from its stand-alone debt level, when τD = 0, lowers
default costs, including those associated with dividend losses. While it is difficult to sign
condition (B.9) in general, it is less likely to hold if the subsidiary tax rate is higher. Indeed,
higher optimal subsidiary debt and default threshold reduce both its expected dividend and
the chances of rescue. The same effect derives from an increase in cash flow volatility, which
also adds to the chances that $1 dividend is lost in the parent default. Other tax-bankruptcy
parameters display a complex impact.8 Section 5.3 sheds further light on optimal parent debt
8For instance, a higher parent tax rate increases both the optimal parent debt and the default threshold.
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relative to the stand-alone counterpart by specializing on Gaussian cash flows, also highlight-
ing a violation of the condition in part (ii) of Theorem 1. The condition in part (iii) of the
theorem requires a high enough cash flow correlation so that parent and subsidiary cash flow
realizations are close if units are equal. Expected dividend transfers are then relatively small
compared to the expected parent cash flows, ensuring that expected default costs saved in
the parent exceed expected foregone dividends. Hence, increasing parent debt above the
stand-alone level increases value.
In the general case in which bailouts are allowed, there is a tension between the payment
of internal dividends and the bailout transfer. An opposite incentive, to exploit the value of
the bailout through larger subsidiary debt and smaller parent debt, counterbalances the effect
described in Theorem 1. The following theorem characterizes the optimal internal ownership
and capital structure, allowing for bailouts but maintaining the absence of dividend taxes.
Theorem 2. Bailout, no IDT.
Let there be bailouts and no IDT (τD = 0). Then, there exist a z(τS, αS, ρ) > 0 and a
z′(τS, αS, ρ) ≥ z > 0 such that
(i) if τP < z, then subsidiary ownership is indefinite. Moreover, the parent has zero leverage
(F ∗P = 0). Finally, the group debt exceeds the debt of two comparable SA firms if and only if
the ratio of default cost rate to tax rate in the subsidiary is below a constant Q; and
(ii) if τP ≥ z′ ≥ z, then the parent fully owns its subsidiary (ω∗ = 1). Moreover, it has
positive optimal debt (F ∗P > 0).
Part (i) of the theorem is an ownership irrelevance proposition. It implies that horizontal
groups, along with hierarchical and pyramidal groups, deliver the same value to their share-
holders if the parent tax rate, τP , is sufficiently low. On the contrary, part (ii) states that
only hierarchical groups with full internal ownership maximize value when the tax rate of
the parent is high enough. The explanation for these ownership patterns is possible thanks
to their joint characterization with optimal capital structure. Under the conditions of part
This can increase the default costs saved through dividends if the probability of successful rescue does not
decrease too much, a possibility that depends on the exact shape of the cash flow distribution. However, it
also increases the expected amount of dividends lost in the parent default, which can lead to a violation of
condition (B.9).
14
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
(i), the parent raises no debt. Zero leverage maximizes the magnitude of the set of states
in which the parent is able to provide a bailout transfer, allowing for both large subsidiary
debt and tax gains. It also maximizes the tax burden in the parent company, whose value is
however limited for a sufficiently low parent tax rate. In this case, the total debt raised by
the group is greater than that of two stand-alone units if the ratio of the default cost rate
to the tax rate in the subsidiary is bounded.
When the conditions of part (ii) apply, the parent no longer specializes in providing
support, because it gains more from increasing its own tax shield than from lowering the
cost of debt financing in the subsidiary via larger bailout transfers. Subsidiary dividends, in
turn, help service parent debt, thereby allowing it to increase its own tax shield. Thus, part
(ii) indicates that full subsidiary ownership can be optimal not only under the assumption
of no bailouts in Theorem 1 but in the general case as well. The result of part (ii) radically
departs from the one in Theorem 2 in Luciano and Nicodano (2014), which indicates optimal
zero parent leverage, for three reasons. First, our model endogenously determines subsidiary
ownership, which is assumed to equal 100% in Luciano and Nicodano (2014). Second, we
allow for a positive dividend payout that is set to zero in Luciano and Nicodano (2014).
Third, we allow for different tax rates in the two units. In sum, Luciano and Nicodano
(2014) highlight a striking special case of capital structure, revealing the power of bailouts
when both the cost of debt and default are endogenous. Our Theorem 2 is a trade-off theory
of capital and ownership structure.
The cut off parent tax rate levels, z and z′, are increasing in τS and inversely u-shaped
in αS. A higher corporate tax rate in the subsidiary increases the likelihood that the parent
has zero leverage because of higher marginal tax savings obtained from additional subsidiary
debt. In turn, a higher default cost rate in the subsidiary triggers two effects. On the one
hand, it makes the parent support more valuable in the set of states when rescue succeeds.
On the other hand, it increases the cost of subsidiary debt and the default threshold, making
it more likely that the subsidiary will default. For low αS, the first effect prevails, and the
cut off levels increase together with the chances of zero parent leverage, while the second
effect overcomes for high αS.
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4.1.1. Understanding heterogeneous ownership and leverage
This section illustrates, by means of a numerical example, how the tax-bankruptcy trade-
off shapes groups, their leverage, and their internal capital market. The tables below show
the characterization of the group for different parametric combinations, when cash flows
are jointly normally distributed. Table 1 displays the effect of changes to both the parent
tax rate and cash flow volatility. It will help understand the heterogeneity in firm capital
structure and valuation, the complementarity between debt and nondebt tax shields, and the
asymmetric consequences of dividends and bailouts. Table 2 will reveal that optimal debt
can be lower in more diversified groups. Both tables display several endogenous variables,
including the ownership share in the subsidiary and the optimal face value of debt. The
expected present value of cash flows is set to 100 in each unit so as to standardize each
endogenous balance sheet item highlighted in the rows.
In Table 1, the third column adopts the benchmark parametrization of Leland (2007)
for BBB-rated firms, with the exception of the cash flow correlation among affiliates (set
to −0.8). All parameters are equal across units. With both corporate tax rates at 20%,
subsidiary ownership turns out to be irrelevant for group value. The expected bailout transfer
is large (47.74), supporting the high subsidiary debt (183) and containing its cost (resulting
from the difference between the face and the market value of debt, which is 183 − 133.58).
Such high debt implies high expected default costs (1.91), despite the bailout transfer, but
allows for a low expected tax burden (12.45) compared to the one of the zero-leverage parent
(20.01). The expected dividend, which is distributed to the parent only if the group is
hierarchical, is negligible precisely because of the large service of subsidiary debt.
A higher parent tax rate, 26% versus 20%, leads to a hierarchical group with 100%
subsidiary ownership (as in both the first and second columns). In the second column,
when all other parameters follow Leland (2007) choices, the large internal dividend (79.30)
supports the highly levered parent (158), which enjoys a relatively low tax burden (18.97)
when considering the 26% tax rate, while the almost zero-leverage subsidiary pays higher
taxes (19.98) despite its lower tax rate. In the second column, as in the benchmark case,
capital structure is extreme. The group can also display a more balanced capital structure,
as in the first column, where the standard deviation of cash flows is twice as large as in the
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previous case. Higher risk makes the tax shield more valuable, because the unit pays taxes
when profitable but does not receive refunds when unprofitable. Increased volatility also
implies that dividends will more likely be lost in the default of the parent. This induces a
substitution effect toward subsidiary debt relative to the lower volatility case. The group
exploits in this case both support channels.
In all the columns, connected companies display larger value than stand-alone companies,
reported in the last row of the table. This value difference increases as cash flow volatility
falls (from the first to the second column) and as the parent tax rate falls (from the second
to the third column). The reason is that fewer dividends are lost in the parent default
(5.31% versus 1.65% versus 0% in the three columns, respectively) due to negative cash flow
correlation. Indeed, the subsidiary tends to be highly profitable when the parent has highly
negative cash flows if cash flow volatility is high. A lower tax rate differential between the
parent and its subsidiary lowers optimal parent debt, reducing the chances of losing dividends
when the parent defaults, and, as a consequence, the incentive to make use of it.9 In the
limiting case of the third column, the parent issues no debt so that no dividend is lost in the
default of the parent and only the bailout channel is exploited.
Four insights derive from this exercise. First, the heterogeneity of optimal leverage in
units with the same tax-bankruptcy parameters, observed by Bernanke, Campbell, and
Whited (1990), arises from transfers between connected units. Indeed, the subsidiary in
the third column displays the same tax-bankruptcy parameters of the subsidiary in the sec-
ond column but has much higher debt (183 versus 1). An intermediate case is the stand-alone
unit that has debt equal to 57.
Second, cum-dividend equity values fall—holding cash flows fixed—because of either
higher debt, or larger transfers to the lenders of supported units, or both. For instance,
subsidiary equity value is as low as 0.43 in the third column, while parent equity value drops
to 0.78 in the second column when they raise all the group debt. Importantly, the value
of group equity is often lower than the (unreported) equity value of two stand-alone units.
For instance, the total equity value is equal to 33.17 in the parametrization of the third
9The same patterns hold in the absence of bailouts, provided cash flow correlation is low enough, since
they depend on dividends, see Table 4.
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Table 1
Group structure, parent tax rates and cash flow volatility
Full ownership Ownership irrelevance
τP = 26%, σ = 44% τP = 26%, σ = 22% τP = 20%, σ = 22%
Value (ν) 165.50 (77.63; 87.87) 160.52 (159.74;0.78) 166.32 (32.74;133.58)
Ownership share (ω) 100% 100% Any
Face value of debt (F ) 182 (40;142) 159 (158;1) 183 (0;183)
Debt value (D) 118.09 (30.22;87.87) 123.70 (122.92;0.78) 133.58 (0;133.58)
Cum-dividend equity value (E) 62.30(47.42;14.88) 116.12(36.82;79.30) 33.17 (32.74;0.43)
Default costs (C) 2.85 (0.24;2.61) 0.78 (0.78;0) 1.91 (0;1.91)
Tax burden (T ) 38.69 (25.14;13.55) 38.95 (18.97;19.98) 32.45 (20.01;12.45)
Dividend transfer (ID) 14.88 79.30 0.43 ×ω
Bailout transfer (B) 15.35 0 47.74
Dividend lost in parent default 5.31% 1.65% 0
Value of SA units 164.91 (80.07;84.84) 158.52 (77.05;81.47) 162.94 (81.47;81.47)
Table 1. The table displays the optimal group structure with different parametric combinations, leading
to full ownership or ownership irrelevance. Unspecified parameters follow the base case in Leland (2007):
αP = αS = 23%, τS = 20%, φ = 0.78, T = 5. Cash flows are jointly Gaussian, with correlation ρ = −0.8.
σS = σP = σ is the annualized percentage volatility of cash flows; τD = 0. Their discounted expected value
is φE[XS ] = XS0 = φE[XP ] = XP0 = 100. Parent and Subsidiary figures are in brackets. The subsidiary
cum-dividend equity value includes the dividend transferred to the parent. Value is the sum of the debt and
equity (net of dividend) claims in each unit.
column versus 78.64 in the stand-alone case. This occurs because on the one hand, the
parent transfers bailout funds to lenders while, on the other, the subsidiary raises all group
debt. Since there is no inefficiency, the mirror image of a lower equity value is a higher value
of debt (also when compared to the case of an equal face value of debt and no bailouts).
The third takeaway regards the relation between nondebt tax sheltering and the debt tax
shield. In a stand-alone unit, they are substitutes (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Graham
and Tucker, 2006) because the reduction in the effective corporate income tax weakens the
incentive to raise debt. In connected units, they can become complements. Consider, in fact,
a nondebt tax shelter, such as the incorporation of the parent in a lower tax rate jurisdiction.
The consequences of this choice are represented by the change from the second to the third
column. Optimal debt increases (from 159 to 183), because the subsidiary has unchanged
tax rate, while the lower parent tax rate permits the provision of larger bailout funds.
The last insight concerns the asymmetry between dividend and bailouts. When the units
display the same tax and default cost rates, as in the third column of Table 1, zero parent
debt is optimal. This pattern indicates that the bailout guarantee is more valuable than the
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dividend transfer, the more so the lower the cash flow correlation. Indeed, a share αP of
dividends gets lost when the parent defaults, while the bailout is conditional on the survival
of the subsidiary.10 This asymmetry also implies that an increase in the overall tax rate for
the group can reduce total optimal debt, while in traditional trade-off theory, debt always
increases. This is visible when we track the increase in the parent income tax rate from 20%
- 26%. As the parent tax rate increases above the threshold, z′, it pays the parent to raise
debt using dividend support. However, dividend support is costlier than bailouts, as a share
of dividends is lost in the parent bankruptcy. This explains the lower optimal debt for the
group.11
Table 2 displays the structure of a hierarchical group as cash flow correlation varies. We
stick to the same parameters as in the first column of the previous table but change to a
lower subsidiary tax rate that ensures full subsidiary ownership. As correlation increases, so
do total debt and total default costs, while total taxes decrease. This pattern reverses the
intuition “more diversification leads to higher debt capacity” that holds in a conglomerate
merger (Leland, 2007). The logic is as follows. The parametric combination “negative
correlation and high cash flow volatility” limits both optimal parent debt, despite the high
tax rate differential and total debt, otherwise foregone dividends would be too high. When
correlation turns positive, the chances of simultaneous realizations of high dividends and low
parent cash flows decrease, limiting dividend losses at a given debt level. As a consequence,
both the optimal parent and total debt grow, also relative to subsidiary debt, exploiting the
favorable tax rate differential.12 Let us stress that there is another reason why optimal debt
increases in correlation. This is most evident when ownership is irrelevant (for the Leland,
2007 base case parameters) and when only bailouts are at work, as in Luciano and Nicodano
(2014). Bailouts mitigate the deadweight default cost only if both cash flows are positive.
With positive correlation, optimal debt is higher because contemporaneous realizations of
10Recall that this modeling captures the fact that a proper parent company has claims to subsidiary’s
assets, while the parent company enjoys limited liability.
11Clearly, an increase in the subsidiary tax rate from 20%-26% impacts total debt as in the trade-off theory
for stand-alone units.
12This effect tends to disappear if we let volatility fall sufficiently, because foregone dividends become
negligible also with negative cash flow correlation.
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Table 2
Hierarchical group structure and cash flow correlation
Correlation
−0.8 −0.5 0 0.5 0.8
Value (ν) 168.20 (129.48; 38.72) 167.92 (98.17; 69.74) 168.49 (101.95; 66.54) 169.71 (129.12; 40.59) 171.56 (128.08; 43.48)
Ownership share (ω) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Face value of debt (F ) 151 (95; 56) 178 (66;112) 202 (88; 114) 241 (176; 65) 258 (187; 71)
Debt value (D) 111.96 (73.24; 38.72) 117.29 (47.55; 69.74) 122.71 (56.17; 66.54) 132.69 (92.10; 40.59) 135.27 (91.79; 43.48)
Cum-dividend equity value (E) 108.54 (56.24; 52.30) 77.24 (50.62; 26.62) 71.94 (45.78; 26.16) 84.83 (37.00; 47.83) 81.08 (36.28; 44.80)
Default costs (C) 1.60 (1.41; 0.19) 3.54 (1.53; 2.01) 5.80 (2.77; 3.03) 10.24 (8.92; 1.32) 10.74 (9.04; 1.70)
Tax burden (T ) 37.65 (23.01; 14.64) 35.61 (23.59; 12.02) 32.76 (21.27; 11.49) 27.10 (13.22; 13.88) 25.28 (11.74; 13.54)
Bailout transfer (B) 2.33 6.83 3.70 0.09 0.003
Dividend transfer (ID) 52.30 26.62 26.16 47.83 44.80
Dividend lost in parent default 1.68% 13.14% 9.86% 15.70% 16.56%
Table 2. Cash flows are jointly Gaussian with XS0 = X
P
0 = 100, σS = σP = σ = 44%. The parameters are
τP = 0.26, τS = 0.16, αP = αS = 0.23, τD = 0, φ = 0.78, and T = 5. Parent and Subsidiary figures are in
brackets. Cum-dividend equity value is the value of equity in each unit that, for the subsidiary, includes
the dividend transferred to the parent. Value is the sum of the debt and equity claims in each unit, where
subsidiary equity value is ex-dividend.
positive cash flow in the parent and positive cash flow in an insolvent subsidiary are frequent,
increasing the chances of bailouts.13
In this section, we have considered no other duty beside corporate income taxes so as to
nest prior results. The next section allows for a tax-bankruptcy trade-off that also encom-
passes group-specific regulatory provisions.
5. A generalized tax-bankruptcy trade-off
Connected units are of interest to regulators because of either governance, tax receipts,
or financial stability motives. IDT have a governance rationale. According to Morck (2005),
IDT help dismantle pyramids, which permit the expropriation of minority shareholders when
the controlling entity enjoys private benefits from control. TC rules and “no bailout” rules,
respectively, stem from a tax receipt and a financial stability rationale. Major Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries impose TC rules and enforce
them especially on domestic subsidiaries of foreign groups to limit interest deductions. Fi-
nally, the Volcker Rule (i.e., Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act) amends the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, prohibiting banking entities from rescuing their SPVs. In the UK,
13Lenders’ losses upon default will also increase in correlation, because default with negative cash flow
becomes more frequent relative to default with positive cash flow. This widens lenders’ required spread
which, being tax-deductible, leads to higher tax savings. In other words, the shift from recovery upon
default (when correlation is low) to higher spread (when correlation is high), while neutral to lenders who
always break even, enjoys a tax incentive.
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the Banking Reform Act of 2013 similarly rules out the voluntary support by depository
institutions to other financial entities in distress within the same bank holding company
(see Segura, 2018). In Korea, units of large chaebols cannot provide guarantees to other
domestic affiliates (Kim, Lim, and Sung, 2007). Against this background, we generalize the
tax-bankruptcy trade-off to allow for group-specific provisions. Our positive analysis will
highlight optimal changes in ownership, the tax burden, and default costs.
Section 5.1 focuses on IDT. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 will in turn highlight the interaction of
IDT with TC rules and “no bailout” rules. Section 5.4 hints at an additional group-specific
provision, namely tax consolidation.
5.1. IDT and optimal ownership mutations
The following theorem characterizes optimal subsidiary ownership (and capital structure)
in the presence of IDT.
Theorem 3. IDT.
Let there be bailouts. Then, the introduction of a tax on the intercorporate dividend trans-
forms a hierarchical group into either (i) a pyramid or a horizontal group (0 ≤ ω∗ < 1) if
τD > τD > 0 and τP > z
′; (ii) a horizontal group (ω∗ = 0) if either τD > τ¯D ≥ τD > 0; or
τP < z. In the latter case, neither the value nor the leverage of the group are affected.
In line with Morck (2005), this theorem highlights the ability of IDT to dismantle hier-
archical groups by imposing a double taxation of dividends. However, Morck (2005) stresses
that IDT dismantle pyramids, assuming they are the optimal way the controlling entity
achieves a control wedge. On the contrary, Theorem 2 and 3 together imply that IDT is
necessary for a pyramid to be the only value-maximizing group structure.
If irrelevance was prevailing prior to the introduction of IDT, the theorem indicates that
ownership transforms in response to even a negligible IDT tax rate. In this case, value is
insensitive to changes in the ownership-control wedge, reminding results in Demsetz and
Lehn (1985). On the contrary, the introduction of a tax on ownership, such as IDT, affects
optimal leverage when a hierarchical group was optimal (see the proof for details). The
reason is that this tax impairs support to the parent company, which reduces its leverage if
the IDT tax rate exceeds the cut offs identified in the theorem.
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Extensive numerical analysis shows that the cut off τD is increasing in τP and αS and
decreasing in τS and αP . Indeed, τD increases when it is more profitable to increase debt in
the parent (higher own tax rate and lower own default cost rate; lower tax rate and higher
default cost rate for the subsidiary), increasing the marginal value of dividends. The cut off
level τ¯D responds to changes in the parameters exactly like τD.
We summarize some implications of Theorem 3 in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. (i) The presence of IDT is a necessary condition for a pyramid to be the only
value-maximizing structure.
(ii) An infinitesimal IDT tax rate can lead to total separation between ownership and control.
(iii) Even a 100% IDT tax rate can leave group value unchanged.
A few remarks are necessary to better clarify the implications of our theorem. First, the
dismantling result in part (ii) of Theorem 3 holds as long as the payout ratio is positive
and inflexible. Such assumption reflects the observation that dividend payouts for corporate
shareholders appear not to adjust to corporate tax clienteles (Barclay, Holderness, and Shee-
han, 2009; Dahlquist, Robertsson, and Rydqvist, 2014). Second, recall that we collapsed the
personal dividend tax into the effective corporate income tax to avoid cumbersome notation.
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 hold as long as the personal tax rate on dividends from the parent
is the same as the one on dividends from its subsidiary. Otherwise, the shift from indirect to
direct ownership may no longer be value neutral, also with a zero-leverage supporting unit.
Third, recall that the notation ω = 0 captures both horizontal groups with positive direct
ownership by the controlling entity as well as orphan subsidiaries entirely held by outsiders.
The reader may wonder whether the parent still bails out its subsidiary when it sells out
its cash flows by setting internal ownership to zero. It is easy to allow for an endogenous
probability of bailout, set by the controlling entity. The ex-ante value-maximizing probability
is equal to one, indicating that subsidiary bailouts increase tax gains and value.14 The reason
is that outsiders will pay a higher price for investing in the orphan subsidiary, anticipating
the conditional bailout transfer.
Fourth, so far there are no costs associated with ownership transformations. These can
14Ex post there is court enforcement, see also footnote 5.
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be sizable when real synergies explain the group structure, thereby limiting the ownership
adjustments highlighted in Table 1 and Theorem 2. We discuss the effects of such costs after
considering TC and prudential rules.
5.2. TC rules
Tax authorities observe that guaranteed subsidiaries display thin equity capital due to
the combination of bailout guarantees and tax shield. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(INTM541010)15 describes their rationale: “Thin capitalization commonly arises where a
company is funded” . . . “by a third party” . . . “but with guarantees” . . . “provided
to the lender by another group company” . . . “The effect of funding a” . . . “company”
. . . “with excessive” . . . “guaranteed debt is” . . . “excessive interest deductions.
It is the possibility of excessive deductions for interest which the” . . . “legislation on
thin capitalization seeks to counteract.” The similarity between this description and the
characterization in the third column of Table 1 is striking, where the three ingredients (low
equity value and high tax savings in the subsidiary, along with high transfers from the parent)
are visible. TC rules directly cap interest deductions or constrain debt/equity ratios below a
certain level. Theorem 4 characterizes the optimal capital structure and ownership following
the introduction of TC rules, also in combination with IDT. Then, Theorem 5 compares
such connected units, subject to group specific taxes, with the stand-alone organization.
Let us denote with (F ∗∗S , F
∗∗
P , ω
∗∗) the solution to our optimization program when sub-
sidiary debt does not exceed the cap K.
Theorem 4. Bailout, IDT and TC.
Let there be bailouts, and let the debt constraint in the guaranteed unit be binding and
equal to K, and let 0 < τD < 1. Then, there exists a cap K¯ such that, for every K ≤ K¯,
i) the parent has optimal positive leverage (F ∗∗P > 0);
ii) optimal subsidiary ownership is partial (ω∗∗ < 1) if τD > τD, full (ω
∗∗ = 1) if τD ≤ τD;
and
15See Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 2006, INTM541010, Introduction to thin capitalisation (legisla-
tion and principles), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110204152928/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
//manuals/intmanual/INTM541010.htm.
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iii) when τD < τD, parent debt F
∗∗
P exceeds the comparable stand-alone level of debt, F
P∗
SA, if
the ratio of parent to subsidiary default cost rate exceeds a constant C.
The first part of the theorem shows that TC rules break ownership irrelevance, because
zero leverage is never optimal for the parent unit. The forced reduction in subsidiary debt
induces debt shifting onto the formerly zero-leverage parent, because increased tax savings
in the parent must substitute for the forced reduction in subsidiary tax savings. As a
consequence, partial subsidiary ownership no longer depends on specific ranges of the parent
corporate income tax rate as in the previous theorem. Finally, the third part of the theorem
builds on the tension between the bailout guarantee on one side and the dividend transfer
on the other. With larger debt, the parent saves larger cash flows from default when the
dividend is sufficient to avoid insolvency. However, larger dividends are lost when they are
insufficient. Moreover, subsidiary default costs increase due to the reduced bailout transfer.
Such larger parent debt creates value when the default cost rate in the parent is sufficiently
high relative to that of the subsidiary (αP
αS
> C).
Let us stress an important caveat. TC rules break ownership irrelevance, when τP < z,
only if the tax authority enforces TC rules in every guaranteed unit, including affiliates of
horizontal groups. If it limits enforcement to proper subsidiaries in hierarchical groups, as it
is often the case in practice, any hierarchical group would transform into a horizontal group
to avoid TC constraints.16 Thus, TC rules are irrelevant for leverage and default. This result
echoes IDT irrelevance in part (i) of Lemma 2, stated in the appendix.
Table 3 exemplifies the results of Theorem 4, following the calibration in Leland (2007).
It also permits an assessment of other nonobvious effects of tax combinations.
In the first column, both TC rules and IDT are absent. The subsidiary displays “thin
capitalization,” i.e., it has negligible equity capital (0.07), high debt (220), and default costs
(8.13), along with a lower tax burden (5.39) than its zero-leverage parent (20.1). When TC
rules constrain subsidiary debt to the stand-alone level (as in the second to fourth columns),
the tax burden of the subsidiary more than triples. Absent IDT, some debt shifts to the
16This observation explains the reason why the UK regulator specifically considers any guaranteed affiliate
to be subject to TC rules.
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Table 3
Group-Specific Taxes and Ownership Mutations
No Thin Cap Thin Cap, F ∗∗S = F
S∗
SA
τD = 0% τD = 0% τD = 1% τD = 7%
Ownership (ω) any 100% 87% 0%
Value (ν) 166.59 163.88 163.51 163.36
Face value of debt (F ) 220 (0;220) 138 (81;57) 131 (74;57) 112 (55;57)
Cum-dividend equity (E) 49.59 (49.52;0.07) 99.36 (60.17;39.19) 98.61 (59.44;39.17) 78.92 (39.80;39.12)
Default costs (C) 8.13 (0;8.13) 1.56 (1.12;0.44) 1.23 (0.85;0.38) 1.02 (0.78;0.24)
Tax burden (T ) 25.40 (20.01;5.39) 34.69 (16.85;17.84) 35.35 (17.18;18.17) 35.57 (17.81; 17.76)
Dividend tax (IDT ) 0 0 0.30 0
Table 3. The table reports the optimal ownership, value, debt, default costs, tax burden, and dividend
tax levied with different levels of dividend taxation, τD, without and with TC rules. Figures of the parent
and subsidiary unit, respectively, are reported in brackets. Cash flows are jointly normally distributed with
correlation ρ = 0.2. Parameters are set according to Leland (2007): αS = αP = 23%, τS = τP = 20%,
φ = 0.78, σS = σP = 0.22, X
S
0 = X
P
0 = 100, and T = 5.
parent to contain the increase in the tax burden (that reaches 36.6%). The parent now
fully owns the equity in the subsidiary, thereby containing its own default costs. When IDT
adds to TC, it takes a modest 1% tax rate to trigger a transformation of the fully owned
hierarchical group into a pyramid (87%), while a 7% rate, consistent with the lowest rate
in the U.S. tax code, is sufficient to dismantle it. Optimal parent leverage decreases in the
dividend tax rate, together with overall value. Default costs are dramatically lower than
in the case without TC ($8.13 versus values ranging from $1.02 to $1.56, depending on the
IDT rate). Interestingly, they are also decreasing in the dividend tax rate: IDT, combined
with TC, contain the distortion generated by the tax shield without hampering the role of
bailouts.
Despite the reduction in debt and value, due to regulation, connected units in Table
3 always show higher value than stand-alone organizations. Moreover, they can combine
private optimality (higher value) with a lower level of expected default costs relative to the
competing stand-alone organization. The following proposition addresses this possibility.
Theorem 5. Group versus stand-alone units: bailout, IDT and TC.
Let there be bailouts. Let the debt constraint in the guaranteed unit be binding at the
stand-alone level, F ∗∗S = F
S∗
SA, and τD > τ¯D. Then, the group displays both lower overall
debt and default costs than the stand-alone organization as well as higher value, despite
group-specific regulation.
The theorem states that a proper combination of TC rules and IDT can generate groups
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with lower leverage and yet higher value than stand-alone organizations. Such higher value
stems from lower default costs since tax savings increase in debt. The intuition for the
proof is as follows. When the IDT tax rate exceeds the upper threshold, the parent does
not own the subsidiary and therefore receives no dividends. The relevant link between the
units remains the bailout of the subsidiary, which increases value by reducing the default
probability. To increase this bailout transfer, the parent optimally maintains lower leverage
than it would as a stand-alone firm.
The analysis we have carried out so far implies a rich variety of capital structures despite
equal tax rates, bankruptcy cost rates, and cash flows distributions. While connected units
usually have higher debt and lower tax burdens than stand-alone units, the last theorem
indicates that we might actually observe regulated cases displaying lower leverage, higher
tax burden and lower default costs. Our positive analysis therefore adds to the insight in
Morck (2005). IDT can be used to transform a hierarchical group into a horizontal group,
generating lower default costs. This result is perhaps not surprising, as second best economics
predicts that two distortions can increase welfare. The following section shows that IDT can
however increase default costs despite lowering group debt.
5.3. The Volcker Rule and IDT
Prudential rules proposed by the Volcker Rule and the Vickers Committee limit the
possibility for banking units to bailout their SPVs (see Segura, 2018). Our Theorem 1
determines the effects of such a ban on ownership and leverage when there are only income
taxes. This section first highlights the impact of a bailout ban on default costs. It then
analyzes the interplay of such prudential rules with the generalized tax-bankruptcy trade-
off.
Table 4 portrays group structure for the same parameters as Table 1. A bailout ban
reduces overall debt and default costs while at the same time increasing the tax burden (first
and third columns), leaving them unchanged only when bailouts are zero in the unconstrained
case (second column). As for capital structure, we know from Theorem 1 that it never pays
to concentrate leverage in the subsidiary, absent bailouts. As a consequence, the parent
company now raises positive debt in the third column and fully owns its subsidiary using
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Table 4
No bailout
τP = 26%, σ = 44% τP = 26%, σ = 22% τP = 20%, σ = 22%
Value (ν) 164.93 (132.21; 32.72) 160.52 (159.74;0.78) 165.14 (162.80;2.34)
Ownership share (ω) 100% 100% 100%
Face value of debt (F ) 151 (100;51) 159 (158;1) 159 (156;3)
Debt value (D) 110.48 (77.76;32.72) 123.70 (122.92;0.78) 124.04 (121.70;2.34)
Cum-dividend equity value (E) 106.22(54.44;51.78) 116.12(36.82;79.30) 118.91 (41.10;77.81)
Default costs (C) 2.62 (1.76;0.86) 0.78 (0.78;0) 0.56 (0.56;0)
Tax burden (T ) 40.92 (22.75;18.17) 38.95 (18.97;19.98) 34.62 (14.71;19.91)
Dividend transfer (ID) 51.78 79.30 77.81
Value of SA units 164.91 (80.07;84.84) 158.52 (77.05;81.47) 162.94 (81.47;81.47)
Face value of debt of SA units 199 (116;83) 117 (60;57) 114 (57;57)
Dividend lost in parent default 2.30% 1.65% 1.23%
Table 4. The table displays the optimal group structure with different parametric combinations when bailouts
are absent. Parameters are the same used in Table 1.
dividend receipts to avoid its own default.
Moreover, the parent has higher optimal debt than its stand-alone counterpart in the
second and third columns, suggesting that condition (B.9) in the appendix holds. Unreported
simulations show that for tax rates in a range (0.16 – 0.26), such that the objective remains
convex when other parameters are the baseline ones, condition (B.9) holds. Violations are
likelier the lower is cash flow correlation, as suggested by Theorem 1, because the subsidiary
more often transfers dividends when the parent defaults. Violations are also likelier the
higher both the tax differential, |τP − τS|, and cash flow volatility are, implying higher
parent debt and extreme cash flow realizations. Thus, when the parent tax rate is equal to
26%, condition (B.9) does not hold for any subsidiary tax rate, provided that volatility is
twice as large as the benchmark case and cash flow correlation is low enough (as in the first
column of Table 4).
A ban on bailouts appears as a substitute to TC rules in the sense that both rules break
ownership irrelevance, increasing subsidiary capitalization and tax burden. However, the
combination of IDT with the ban on bailouts has the following distinct effects. Table 5
displays such effects, as the IDT rate increases, with the same parametrization used in Table
3 in the previous section. With a zero IDT rate, a ban on bailouts causes a reduction in the
subsidiary debt from 220 in the unrestricted case (see the first column of Table 3) to 42. At
the same time, there is debt shifting toward the parent unit, from 0 up to 94. Thus, the
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Volcker Rule reduces both group debt (from 220 to 136) and default costs (from 8.13% to
1.67% of cash flows).
Table 5
Effects of IDT on ownership and leverage, no bailouts
τD = 0% τD = 1% τD = 7%
Ownership (ω) 100% 90% 0%
Value (ν) 163.67 163.20 162.94
Face value of debt (F ) 136 (94;42) 137 (86;51) 114 (57;57)
Cum-dividend equity (E) 110.92 (61.49; 49.43) 99.84(56.57; 43.27) 78.64 (39.32;39.32)
Default costs (C) 1.67 (1.36;0.31) 1.89 (1.29;0.60) 1.78 (0.89;0.89)
Tax burden (T ) 34.77 (16.33;18.44) 34.98 (16.62;18.36) 35.62 (17.81;17.81)
Dividend tax (IDT ) 0 0.35 0
Table 5. The table reports the optimal ownership, value, debt, default costs, tax burden, and dividend tax
levied with different levels of dividend taxation, τD, when bailouts are not allowed. Figures in brackets refer
to the parent and the subsidiary unit, respectively. Cash flows are jointly Gaussian, with correlation ρ = 0.2.
The other parameters used in the analysis follow Leland (2007): αS = αP = 23%, τS = τP = 20%, φ = 0.78,
σS = σP = 22%, X
S
0 = X
P
0 = 100, and T = 5.
As the IDT tax rate increases to a modest level (τD = 1%), parent ownership of the
subsidiary drops to 90%. While total debt is almost unchanged (137 versus 136) and more
balanced between the two units (86 in the parent, 51 in the subsidiary versus 94 to 41),
default costs increase markedly (1.89 versus 1.67) because of the ban on bailouts. When τD
further increases (to 7%), as in the third column, optimal ownership of the subsidiary by the
parent falls to zero. The SPV subsidiary is directly owned by the controlling party or sold to
outside financiers. The two units never transfer funds internally, and their optimal capital
structure decisions coincide with those of stand-alone firms. Default costs however increase,
relative to the zero IDT rate case (1.78 versus 1.67), even though the overall leverage is lower
(114 versus 136).
This analysis shows that IDT interfere with prudential regulation, which by itself elimi-
nates the incentive to create a highly levered subsidiary SPV, containing default costs. The
presence of IDT can increase default costs, contrary to the case of combinations with TC, by
damaging the only remaining internal support channel—the one based on internal dividends.
These last two results emphasize that financial stability outcomes depend on taxes through
not only the level of debt but internal ownership as well.
28
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
5.4. Group synergies and tax consolidation
In the previous sections, group affiliation delivers financial synergies only. However, real
synergies can also stem from, and motivate, internal ownership connections. They may ease
investment choices (as in Stein, 1997 and Matvos and Seru, 2014) and labor reallocation (as
in Cestone et al., 2017) or foster the interaction between product market competition and
workers’ incentives (as in Fulghieri and Sevilir, 2011). Another synergy enjoyed by groups is
tax consolidation by which a profitable parent can use subsidiary losses to reduce its taxable
income and vice versa. This section discusses the robustness of our results to such additional
synergies, which can affect the predictions of our model in two respects. The first concerns
both total leverage and the optimal wedge in the debt levels of the two units. The second
regards the sensitivity of ownership to IDT.
At first glance, the presence of a real synergy can provide scope for higher leverage
by enhancing group profitability in states of joint survival. However, such synergy also
increases the cost of the selective default, as the surviving unit is no longer able to exploit
it. This discourages debt differences, reducing the sensitivity of debt to the tax rate of
each individual unit, thereby containing the overall debt level as well. The above argument
applies to synergies that increase performance in good states. The possibility to transfer
workers from the unit in default to the unit in operation, described in Cestone et al. (2017),
is instead an example of a synergy reducing the costs of selective default in bad states. This
insurance-like synergy can increase the wedge in the optimal leverage of the two units. The
net effect of a real synergy on leverage is therefore not obvious, depending on the prevailing
type.
The second effect of a real synergy is to reduce the responsiveness of ownership to IDT.
However, such slower response appears only if the ownership transformation from a hierar-
chical to a horizontal group reduces the synergy benefits.
As for tax consolidation, this is an option for the connected units to jointly file for taxes.
Sometimes the option is conditional on ownership exceeding a threshold, 1 > ω¯ > 0. 17 Such
17Consolidation is an option at the federal level in the US and in other EU jurisdictions, such as France,
Italy, and Spain, provided internal ownership exceeds some predetermined threshold. The latter is lower for
SPVs in the US. It is forbidden in certain jurisdictions, such as the UK and some US states.
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option is valuable, because it implies that the tax burden of the group never exceeds the one
of stand-alone units and is typically smaller. However, a trade-off, involving the choice of
leverage, can emerge between the optimization of consolidation gains on the one hand and
that of tax shield gains on the other.
The ownership irrelevance result of part (i) of Theorem 2 should hold for a sufficiently
high cash flow correlation between the units, because the tax shield option is more valuable,
relative to the consolidation option, the higher correlation is. For low correlation levels, the
case of ownership irrelevance is less likely to hold and can disappear: the minimum optimal
internal ownership is at least equal to the prescribed ownership threshold for consolidation,
ω¯ > 0, to trigger consolidation gains on top of the tax shield optimization. The introduction
of IDT impacts on the consolidation versus tax shield trade-off. Increasing ownership up to
the prescribed threshold, ω¯, lowers the tax burden through consolidation on the one hand but
increases taxes paid on intercorporate dividends on the other. Given a high τP , the presence
of consolidation synergies implies that internal ownership drops below 100% for a higher cut
off level of the IDT tax rate in part (ii) of Theorem 3. At the consolidation threshold, ω¯, it
takes a discontinuous increase in the IDT tax rate to dismantle the hierarchical group.
The above reasoning takes the two-unit structure as given. However, the controlling
entity may be able to avoid the trade-off by setting up separate vehicles, characterized by a
low tax rate τP , that sell cash flow rights to outsiders and optimize the tax shield, while the
rest of the group exploits consolidation. In this case, the analysis in the previous sections
holds for these separate “tax arbitrage vehicles.”
With these caveat in mind, the following section will discuss the implications of our
theory in the light of some stylized facts.
6. Model implications and observations on group structure
This section scans through some observed behavior of connected units, following the logic
of our analysis. This logic highlights the use of internal resources, in a tax-bankruptcy per-
spective, without considering real synergies, the allocation of funds to competing investment
projects, and the extraction of private benefits. It also highlights an array of group struc-
tures, with a prominent role for hierarchical groups with fully owned subsidiaries, rather
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than pyramids.
The case of multinationals appears to fit this logic. Parent companies wholly own the
vast majority of their foreign subsidiaries in a sample of 634 major US multinational firms.
Almost 40% of firms are directly owned by their US parent company. The remaining firms,
comprising 33, 051 foreign subsidiaries, are arranged into more complex ownership struc-
tures. Out of this total, 37% of subsidiaries are part of hierarchical structures. Various
tax considerations are an important factor in structuring affiliate ownership (Lewellen and
Robinson, 2013). This evidence shows the existence of an even richer set of ownership struc-
tures responding to a richer array of foreign tax considerations. Hierarchical groups are not
special to multinationals. The investigation of 270,374 groups in 129 countries reveals that
two-thirds of the 1,519,588 affiliates are held domestically. US groups represent an exception
in that affiliates abroad represent almost half of the total (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013).
The above evidence may be consistent with both parts of Theorem 2. However, part (ii) of
Theorem 2 highlights that internal dividends help support parent companies. Such support
can be the reason why continental European groups have larger debt in parent companies
than in subsidiaries (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006) and display positive correlation between
subsidiary dividends and the parent firms’ debt (De Jong et al., 2012). These hierarchical
groups are often not widely held (Bloch and Kremp, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002), as our
results would suggest. The use of internal support to contain bankruptcy risk and enhance
borrowing capacity is present in family groups around the world (Masulis, Pham, and Zein,
2011). Group firms have higher mean dividend yield than nongroup firms. The dividend
difference with respect to nongroup firms is higher for bottom than for apex firms. Group
firms are also able to borrow more than their nongroup peers. Within pyramidal groups,
companies in the upper layers borrow more than companies at the bottom.
As far as valuation is concerned, Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) uncover lower equity
value (Q) of group affiliates with respect to nongroup peers in apex companies, where the
separation of ownership from control is minimal but not in bottom companies. This evidence
is hard to reconcile with expropriation of minorities through pyramids. Our analysis can help
explain this evidence, associating lower equity value of parent companies with the provision
of bailout funds to other affiliates’ lenders (as in Table 1, Column 3).
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Our results show that only group-specific tax provisions make partial or zero subsidiary
ownership optimal (see Corollary 1). Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) show that the percent-
age of both family groups and family pyramids in a cross-section of countries is negatively
related to an index of intragroup tax provisions, including thin capitalization rules, that
measures the stringency of tax laws concerning to intragroup transactions. Kandel et al.
(2015) recall that, in the 1930s and 1940s, pyramids were pervasive in the US. The control-
ling entities, both families and widely held companies, flattened out their groups in response
to the introduction of IDT, although some kept their layers by exploiting the exemptions
granted to large ownership stakes. Currently, direct control via a horizontal structure is a
common form of family ownership, although 80% of the firms preserve some indirect own-
ership through trusts, foundations, corporations, and limited partnership (Villalonga and
Amit, 2009).18
Our model indicates that intercorporate links allow the group to better exploit the trade-
off between lower tax burden and higher default costs when interest deductions distort debt
incentives, as shown by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004). Another implication of our model,
that emerges in the sample of multinational companies studied by Brok (2018), is that a
change in the tax rate of one affiliate has nonlinear effects on total group debt. As far as
TC rules are concerned, our model implies debt shifting onto the parent company when TC
rules are strictly enforced on subsidiaries. Blouin et al. (2014) find that foreign affiliates’
leverage responds to the introduction of TC rules in US multinationals. However, the ratio
of debt to assets of the consolidated worldwide firm does not react to the introduction of TC
rules. This observation suggests that the multinational firm engages in debt shifting toward
other group affiliates.
Our results (Theorem 2 part (i)) imply that indifference between full, partial, or zero
subsidiary ownership is likely to hold when τP = τS and there is no double taxation of div-
idends. This case of ownership irrelevance well represents financial conduits. Conduits are
structured to be tax neutral to avoid double taxation.19 Consistent with ownership irrel-
18Cooper et al. (2016) show a more recent ownership adjustment with a tax motivation. US business income
migrates away from traditional corporations, with a 31.6% average tax rate, into pass-through partnerships,
with a 15.9% rate.
19Tax neutrality applied as long as the Internal Revenue Service did not classify the SPV as a corporation.
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evance, conduits appear to be incorporated, at times, as proper subsidiaries with positive
parent ownership and, in other instances, as orphan SPVs with zero parent ownership (Gor-
ton and Souleles, 2007). Consistent with the presumption that conduits reduce the overall
tax burden, Han, Park, and Pennacchi (2015) show that securitization increases with the
corporate tax rate, i.e., with incentives to exploit the tax shield. A reduction of the tax
burden is possible in our model because the conduit-subsidiary deducts interest from taxes
while enjoying support from its parent. In securitization, as Peaslee and Nirenberg (2001)
report, the SPV issues securities classified as debt instruments, with tax-deductible interests,
depending on the type of transaction between the sponsor parent and the SPV. Moreover,
there is a mechanism akin to a bailout transfer: the sponsoring unit and the investors agree
upon the state-contingent subsidization of the vehicle, beyond the formal obligations of the
sponsor (Gorton and Souleles, 2007).
Private equity funds are also pass-through entities for US tax purposes. As a result, the
entity’s income, gains, losses, deductions, and credits are passed through to the partners
and taxed only once at the investor level, avoiding the double taxation of profits. Funds are
usually formed as Delaware limited partnerships or limited liability companies.20 This allows
to classify membership interests into different classes (like common and preferred stock) with
different rights and preferences. Distributions do not need to be proportionate to ownership,
and they can be specified in the agreement along with liquidation and voting preferences.
Private equity funds, investing outside of the US, are often formed in jurisdictions with
favorable tax regimes.21 Target companies in going-private buyout transactions are highly
levered throughout the merger waves (Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011). This private equity
fund with its levered LBO firms echoes the low tax zero-leverage parent that owns, with
indefinite ownership interest, its levered subsidiary in our model.22 Additionally, the private
This would be the case if the SPV engaged in some active business beside passively administering the
proceeds from its asset pool, and/or if it had multiple ownership classes without enjoying a REMIC (real
estate mortgage investment conduit) status (see Peaslee and Nirenberg, 2001).
20Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990) discuss the tax disadvantage of the S corporate form relative to the
partnership form after the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
21See the practice note by Naidech, S., 2011, Private Equity fund formation, Practical Law Company,
http://us.practicallaw.com/3-509-1324.
22In particular, condition (B.10) in the appendix is satisfied for any tax rate, as G(0) = 0 when the parent
is a fund.
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equity fund participates in the restructurings of the firm via a state-contingent support
mechanism, i.e., when it is insolvent but profitable. Leverage in LBO firms thus contributes
to tax savings and value creation (Acharya et al., 2013; Kaplan, 1989) along with efficiency
gains (see Axelson, Stro¨mberg, and Weisbach, 2009), that are absent in our set up.
As for capital structure, our model provides a candidate explanation for some puzzling
evidence that appears at odds with the traditional trade-off theory. First, it shows that
dividend-paying subsidiaries can have zero optimal leverage, beside the parent companies in
Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that might pay zero dividends. For instance, in the second
column of Table 1, the (almost) zero-leverage subsidiary supports its parent company, dis-
playing also comparatively higher dividends, market value (to book value) of equity, and tax
burden than its proxy positive leverage subsidiaries in columns 1 and 3. These characteristics
match the ones of dividend-paying zero-leverage and almost zero-leverage firms in Strebulaev
and Yang (2013). Last but not least, our theory may explain the heterogeneity in the capital
structure choices of companies with the same tax-bankruptcy parameters, first observed in
the US by Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited (1990). The logic of the model is that capital
structure in a given firm depends not only on its own tax-bankruptcy parameters but on the
transfers to and from (possibly unlisted) connected units as well.23
7. Summary and concluding comments
This paper determines the ownership structure of two units under common control, aban-
doning the textbook fiction of the stand-alone firm. It elaborates on the idea that internal
ownership helps support upstream units while limited liability preserves them from conta-
gion. This idea also leads to new insights on the relation between tax rates and debt, support
and default costs, value and diversification, and debt and nondebt tax shields.
Our results show how tax provisions generate the variety of ownership structures of
connected units that we commonly observe. Hierarchical organizations with fully owned
subsidiaries are optimal when the parent tax rate is sufficiently high, as they can exploit
both bailouts and internal dividends as supporting mechanisms. Any ownership structure
23This resembles the logic underlying the study of Faulkender and Smith (2016).
34
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
can instead emerge when the tax rate of the supporting unit is small, leading to an unbalanced
capital structure with debt concentrated in the supported unit. A small tax rate calls to
mind tax arbitrage vehicles that reduce their effective tax rate through either nondebt tax
shields or incorporation in low tax jurisdictions. The endogenous interest spread plays a
crucial role, together with bailouts, in generating ownership irrelevance. It is the positive
feedback from higher default costs to higher tax savings that leads to a zero-leverage parent.
Our model also embeds group specific provisions in the tax-bankruptcy trade-off analysis,
extending it beyond income taxes. The presence of IDT discourages direct ownership, and
either pyramids or horizontal groups can become value maximizing. TC rules, if applying to
proper subsidiaries only, do not contain leverage in tax arbitrage vehicles, which can change
their ownership structure to preserve tax savings. On the contrary, they are effective if they
apply to all guaranteed affiliates. No bailout rules appear as substitutes to TC rules, as they
contain both tax savings and default costs. However, IDT can interfere with this prudential
rule and increase default costs by limiting the only remaining internal support mechanism. In
a nutshell, we highlight the tax-bankruptcy motives of complex structures, leaving aside real
synergies, contractual incompleteness, agency problems, and inter-temporal issues stressed
in prior capital structure literature.
Our structural analysis implies that the observed heterogeneity in the capital structure
choices of listed companies with the same tax-bankruptcy parameters depends on the trans-
fers to and from (possibly unlisted) connected units. It therefore suggests an agenda for
future empirical work, jointly considering capital and ownership structure.
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Appendix A. Definition of the h(·) and k(·) functions.
The function h(XS) defines the set of states of the world in which the parent company has
enough funds to intervene in saving its affiliate from default while remaining solvent. The
rescue happens if the cash flows of the parent XP are enough to cover both the obligations
of the parent and the remaining part of those of the subsidiary. The function h(XS), which
defines the level of parent cash flows above which the rescue occurs, is defined in terms of
the cash flows of the subsidiary as:
h(XS) =
 XdP + FS1−τS − XS1−τS XS < XZS ,XdP +XdS −XS XS ≥ XZS .
Similarly, the function k(XP ), which describes the level of dividends required to rescue
the parent from default, is defined as
k(XP ) =
 XdS + FP−XPω(1−τS)(1−τD) XP < XZP ,XdS + FP−τPXZP−(1−τP )XPω(1−τD)(1−τS) XP ≥ XZP .
When XS < X
Z
S (XP < X
Z
P ), the cash flow XS (XP ) of the subsidiary does not give rise to
any tax payment, as it is below the tax shield generated in that unit.
Appendix B. Proofs.
Appendix B.1. Proof that a stand-alone firm has positive leverage (F ∗SA > 0) when φ = 1.
First of all, let us suppress both the i superscript and the subscripts SA and i for
notational simplicity. The derivative of debt D with respect to F for a stand-alone unit is
dD
dF
= φ
[
−αdX
d
dF
Xdf(Xd) + τ
dXZ
dF
(
G(Xd)−G(XZ))+ 1−G(Xd)] . (B.1)
When F = 0, it follows that
dD(0)
dF
= φ(1−G(0)).
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The derivative of the tax shield XZ in F is dXZ/dF = 1− dD
dF
, while that of the default
threshold Xd is dXd/dF = 1 + τ
1−τ
dD
dF
.
Default costs are nondecreasing in F , since dC
dF
= αXdf(Xd)dX
d
dF
φ. This derivative is 0
when F = 0. The tax burden is decreasing in F: dT
dF
= −τφdXZ
dF
(
1−G(XZ)).
It follows that the sum of taxes and default costs is always nonincreasing in F at F = 0
when φ = 1:
dT (0)
dF
+
dC(0)
dF
= −τG(0) (1−G(0)) ≤ 0, (B.2)
and it is strictly decreasing unless G(0) = 1 or G(0) = 0, i.e., the firm is never profitable or
always profitable, respectively. When 0 < G(0) < 1, then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the
minimum program for a stand-alone unit are violated at F = 0. Such conditions are indeed:
dT (F )
dF
+ dC(F )
dF
= λ (i)
λF = 0 (ii)
λ ≥ 0. (iii)
When F = 0, λ ≥ 0 and condition (i) is violated, since its left-hand side (l.h.s.), when φ = 1,
is strictly negative, as Eq. (B.2) shows.
Appendix B.2. Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the minimum program (9).
For simplicity, we only report the dependence of the functions on the parent and sub-
sidiary debt and the evaluation of the conditions at ω∗, when necessary.
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
dTPSA(F
∗
P )
dFP
+
dCPSA(F
∗
P )
dFP
− ∂Γ(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FP
− ∂∆C(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FP
+
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FP
= µ1, (i)
F ∗P ≥ 0, (ii)
µ1F
∗
P = 0, (iii)
dTSSA(F
∗
S)
dFS
+
dCSSA(F
∗
S)
dFS
− ∂Γ(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FS
− ∂∆C(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂FS
= µ2, (iv)
F ∗S ≥ 0, (v)
µ2F
∗
S = 0, (vi)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0 (vii)
−∂∆C(F ∗P ,F ∗S)
∂ω
+
∂∆T (F ∗P ,F
∗
S)
∂ω
= µ3 + µ4 (viii)
ω∗ − 1 ≤ 0 (ix)
ω∗ ≥ 0 (x)
µ3(ω
∗ − 1) = 0 (xi)
µ4(ω
∗) = 0 (xii)
µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 ≥ 0. (xiii)
(B.3)
Appendix B.3. Properties of Γ,∆C,∆T
Lemma 1. The default costs saved by the subsidiary, Γ, are nonincreasing in parent debt. The
default costs saved by the parent, ∆C, are nondecreasing in internal ownership, and they are
nonincreasing in subsidiary debt. Both internal dividends and the additional tax burden,
∆T , are nonincreasing in the subsidiary debt, insensitive to parent debt, and nondecreasing
in internal ownership.
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Proof. The integral expressions of Γ, ∆C and ∆T are
Γ = αS
∫ XdS
0
∫ +∞
h(XS)
xg(x, y)dydx
∆C = αPφ
[∫ XZP
0
∫ +∞
XdS+
FP−x
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
xg(x, y)dydx+
∫ XdP
XZP
∫ +∞
XdS+
FP−τPXzP−(1−τP )x
ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
xg(x, y)dydx+
−
∫ XZP
0
∫ XdS+ FP−xω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
DIV (y, FS)g(x, y)dydx +
−
∫ XdP
XZP
∫ XdS+FP−τPXZP−(1−τP )xω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
DIV (y, FS)g(x, y)dydx+
−
∫ 0
−∞
∫ XdS+ FPω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
DIV (y, FS)g(x, y)dydx
]
∆T = φωτD
∫ +∞
XdS
[(1− τS)x+ τSXZS − FS)]f(x)dx,
where DIV (y;FS) = ω(1− τD)
[
(1− τS)y + τSXZS − FS
]
.
We now compute the relevant derivatives, and we prove our statement:
∂Γ
∂FP
= −αSφ
∂XdP
∂FP
[∫ XZS
0
xg
(
x,XdP +
FS
1− τS
− x
1− τS
)
dx+
∫ XdS
XZ
S
xg
(
x,XdP +X
d
S − x
)
dx
]
≤ 0, (B.4)
∂∆C
∂FP
= αPφ
[
∂XdP
∂FP
∫ +∞
XdS
XdP g(X
d
P , y)dy+
−
∫ XZP
−∞
FP
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)g
(
x,XdS +
FP − x+
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dx+ (B.5)
−
∫ XdP
XZP
 1− τP ∂XZP∂FP
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)
(FP + τP (x−XZP )) g(x,XdS + FP − τPXZP − (1− τP )xω(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dx

∂∆C
∂FS
= −αPφ
[
∂XdS
∂FS
∫ XZP
0
FP g
(
x,XdS +
FP − x
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dy+
+
∫ XZP
−∞
∫ XdS+ FP−x+ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
[
τS
∂XZS
∂FS
− 1
]
g(x, y)dydx+
+
∂XdS
∂FS
∫ XdP
XZP
[
FP − τPXZP + τPx
]
g
(
x,XdS +
FP − τPXZP − (1− τP )x
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dx+
+
∫ XdP
XZP
∫ XdS+FP−τPXZP−(1−τP )xω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
[
τS
∂XZS
∂FS
− 1
]
g(x, y)dydx
 ≤ 0
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∂∆T
∂FP
= 0, (B.6)
∂∆T
∂FS
= φωτD
[
τS
dXZS
dFS
− 1
]
(1−G(XdS)) ≤ 0.
∂∆C
∂ω
= αPφ
[∫ XZP
−∞
FP
FP − x+
ω2(1− τD)(1− τS)g
(
x,XdS +
FP − x
ω(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dx+
+
∫ XdP
XZP
[FP − τPXZP + τPx]
FP − τPXZP − (1− τP )x
ω2(1− τD)(1− τS) g
(
x,XdS +
FP − τPXZP − (1− τP )x
ω2(1− τD)(1− τS)
)
dx+
−
∫ XZP
−∞
∫ XdS+ FP−x+ω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
DIV (y, FS)
ω
g(x, y)dydx +
−
∫ XdP
XZP
∫ XdS+FP−τPXZP−(1−τP )xω(1−τD)(1−τS)
XdS
DIV (y, FS)
ω
g(x, y)dydx
 ≥ 0. (B.7)
∂∆C
∂ω
≥ 0 descends from our assumptions of convexity on the objective function and of
a unimodal marginal density f . In such case, default costs saved in the parent through
dividends do not fall when the dividend transfer from the subsidiary increase. The change in
the tax burden due to IDT is always nondecreasing in ω as well, as, ceteris paribus, higher
dividend taxes are paid when the ownership share is higher:
∂∆T
∂ω
= φτD
∫ +∞
XdS
(x(1− τS) + τSXZS − FS)f(x)dx ≥ 0. (B.8)
This derivative has value zero when τD = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let us analyze the Kuhn-Tucker condition (i) when the bailout is absent and thus ∂Γ
∂FP
= 0.
The condition is violated for every FS when evaluated at FP = 0. Indeed,
∂TPSA(0)
∂FP
+
∂CPSA(0)
∂FP
<
0, because of convexity of the stand-alone problem. The two remaining terms appearing in
the l.h.s. are zero when FP = 0 and τD = 0, as one can easily see from Eq. (B.5) and Eq.
(B.6). As a consequence, condition (i) is never satisfied (the right hand side (r.h.s.) of the
inequality being zero), and the parent optimally raises nonzero debt: F ∗P > 0.
We now study the choice of optimal ownership when F ∗P > 0. Let us first consider
ω∗ = 0, i.e., µ4 ≥ 0 and µ3 = 0. Condition (viii) is violated, since the l.h.s. is negative at
ω = 0 from Eq. (B.7). Hence, zero ownership is not optimal. The existence of an interior
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solution, 0 < ω∗ < 1, requires both µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 0. Condition (viii) is satisfied only for
ω∗ →∞, which violates condition (ix). Hence, no interior solution satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Finally, let us analyze the corner solution ω∗ = 1, which requires µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 = 0.
Condition (viii) is satisfied for an appropriate µ3; all other conditions can be satisfied at
F ∗S , F
∗
P , ω
∗ = 1. It follows that ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0. This proves the first part of the
proposition.
Let us now turn to the second part of our proposition. It is sufficient, given our convexity
assumption and since ∆C is nonincreasing in FS, to show that
∂∆C(FP∗SA ,F
S∗
SA)
∂FP
> 0. This rules
out the possibility of a solution with F ∗P ≤ F P∗SA, as the Kuhn-Tucker condition (i) in Eq.
(B.3) is never satisfied. Considering expression (B.5), such condition requires that
αP φ
[
∂XdP
∂FP
∫ +∞
XdS
XdPg(X
d
P , y)dy+
−
∫ XZP
−∞
F P∗SA
(1− τS)g
(
x,XdS +
F P∗SA − x+
(1− τS)
)
dx+ (B.9)
−
∫ XdP
XZP
1− τP ∂XZP∂FP
(1− τS)
(F P∗SA + τP (x−XZP )) g(x,XdS + F P∗SA − τPXZP − (1− τP )x(1− τS)
)
dx
 > 0,
where all the thresholds are evaluated at the stand-alone debt levels (F P∗SA, F
S∗
SA). Indeed,
this condition requires that the marginal change in default costs saved due to an increase
over parent debt above the optimal stand-alone level is positive.
Let us turn to the last part of the theorem. Consider the case of equal debts at the op-
timal level for the stand-alone units. With perfect correlation, subsidiary dividends neither
rescue the parent nor are lost in its default, since both affiliates are either solvent or defaulted
in the same states of the world. This proves part (iii) and concludes our proof of the theorem.
Notice that marginally increasing parent debt while reducing debt in the subsidiary leaves
default costs unchanged and therefore tax savings. With slightly lower correlation, there will
be instances where dividends rescue the parent when its cash flow is just below the parent
default threshold and the subsidiary cash flow just above it. Since expected parent cash
flows are larger than dividends, savings in default costs are positive, and condition (B.9)
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holds.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (i) to (xiii) in Eq. (B.3). Under our convexity
assumption, these conditions are necessary and sufficient. We first investigate the existence
of a solution in which F ∗P = 0, holding FS > 0. If such a solution does not exist, then
convexity implies the existence of another solution with F ∗P > 0. After determining optimal
capital structure, we turn to optimal ownership structure.
A solution for capital structure characterized by F ∗P = 0, F
∗
S > 0 implies µ1 ≥ 0 and
µ2 = 0. We focus on condition (iv) first. We have to prove that the term −∂∆C(F
∗
P=0,F
∗
S)
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗P=0,F
∗
S)
∂FS
has a negative limit as subsidiary debt, FS, tends to zero and a positive limit
when FS goes to infinity, since the rest of the l.h.s. does, under the technical assumptions
that xf(x) converges as x −→ +∞ (see Luciano and Nicodano, 2014).
Note that ∂∆C(0,FS)
∂FS
= 0 for every FS, because this derivative measures the change in
parent default costs associated with subsidiary dividends, when the parent has zero debt.
Moreover, ∂∆T
∂FS
is always lower than or equal to zero and has a negative limit as FS goes to
zero, since limFS−→0
∂XZS
∂FS
= 1−φ(1−G(0)) > 0. When FS goes to infinity, ∂∆T∂FS goes to zero,
as G(XdS) tends to one. This proves that, when F
∗
P = 0, there exists an F
∗
S > 0, which solves
the equation that equates the l.h.s. of condition (iv) to zero.
Let us now turn to condition (i). We recall that the derivative ∂∆C
∂FP
vanishes at F ∗P = 0,
see Eq. (B.5). Hence, we look for conditions such that the l.h.s. of condition (i) is positive
and set it equal to µ1 to fulfill it. The l.h.s. of (i) is positive if
τP (1− τP )G(0)(1−G(0))
1− τPG(0) ≤ αS
[∫ XZS
0
xg
(
x,
FS
1− τS −
x
1− τS
)
dx+
+
∫ XdS
XZS
xg(x,XdS − x)dx
]
. (B.10)
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Under our convexity assumption, the r.h.s. is increasing in FS. Hence, a sufficient condition
for the existence of a zero-leverage parent is
τP (1− τP )G(0)(1−G(0))
1− τPG(0) ≤ αS
[∫ XS,Z∗SA
0
xg
(
x,
F S∗SA
1− τS −
x
1− τS
)
dx+
+
∫ XS,d∗SA
XZ∗
SAS
xg(x,XS,d∗SA − x)dx
]
, (B.11)
where G(0) is the cumulative probability of a (parent) cash flow lower than or equal to
zero, F S∗SA is the optimal debt of the stand-alone counterpart of the subsidiary (i.e., that
receives no bailout transfer from its parent and transfers no dividend to its parent), and
XS,Z∗SA , X
S,d∗
SA represent its optimal tax shield and default threshold, respectively. Both sides
of this inequality are nonnegative. The l.h.s. is increasing in τP , while the right-hand side
(r.h.s.) is independent of τP . Hence, for any fixed value of the r.h.s., there exists a low
enough value of τP satisfying this condition. We define z(ρ, αS, αP , τS) as the cut off value
of the parent tax rate. Then, τP < z is a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution
in which F ∗P = 0. Straightforward differentiation shows that z(ρ, αS, αP , τS) is independent
of αP , increasing in τS, and inversely u-shaped in αS.
The second result concerning capital structure contained in part (i) follows directly from
Theorem 2 part (ii) in Luciano and Nicodano (2014). The constant Q is equal to
Q =
Pr(XS > X¯
Z
S )
∂X¯ZS
∂FS
X¯dS
∂X¯dS
∂FS
Pr(XS = X¯dS, XP < 0) +
∂h
∂FS
∫ X¯dS
0
xg(x, h(x))dx
, (B.12)
where the notation Pr(Y ) is used to refer to the probability of event Y , and X¯ZS and X¯
d
S
are the no tax and default threshold respectively, evaluated at FP = 0, FS = F
P∗
SA + F
S∗
SA.
We are now ready to turn to ownership, thereby completing the proof of part (i). When
τP ≤ z, implying F ∗P = 0, condition (viii) is satisfied for any ω. The dividend from the
subsidiary, ω, has no effect on both the parent default costs (∆C = 0 because F ∗P = 0,
implying XdP = 0) and the tax burden (∆T = 0 because τD = 0 by assumption). Hence ω
has no effect on the value of the parent. Similarly, the tax burden of the subsidiary and its
value are independent of ω. It follows that ω∗ is indefinite.
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Let us now prove part (ii). Let us consider again the Kuhn-Tucker condition (i). This
condition is not satisfied at (FP = 0, FS = F
∗
S) when
τP (1− τP )G(0)(1−G(0))
1− τPG(0) > αS
[∫ XZS
0
xg
(
x,
FS
1− τS −
x
1− τS
)
dx+
+
∫ XdS
XZS
xg(x,XdS − x)dx
]
. (B.13)
We define the level of τP above which condition (B.13) is satisfied as z
′. Notice that z′ > z,
since F ∗S ≥ F ∗SA when FP = 0. Then, when τP > z′, the parent optimally raises debt, as
there exists no solution in which F ∗P = 0. We consider now the choice of optimal ownership
when F ∗P > 0.
Let us first assume ω∗ = 0, µ4 ≥ 0 and µ3 = 0. Condition (viii) is violated, since the
l.h.s. is negative at ω = 0 from Eq. (B.7). Hence, zero ownership is not optimal. The
existence of an interior solution, 0 < ω∗ < 1, requires both µ3 = 0 and µ4 = 0. Condition
(viii) is satisfied only for ω∗ →∞, which violates condition (ix). Hence, no interior solution
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Finally, let us analyze the corner solution ω∗ = 1,
which requires µ3 ≤ 0, µ4 = 0. Condition (viii) is satisfied for an appropriate µ3; all other
conditions can be satisfied at F ∗S , F
∗
P , ω
∗ = 1. It follows that ω∗ = 1 when τD = 0; as such,
part (ii) is proven.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Before proving the theorem, let us state and prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let the tax rate on intercorporate dividend be positive (0 < τD < 1). Then
(i) if τP ≤ z, the optimal internal ownership is zero (ω∗ = 0); and
(ii) if τP ≥ z′, then there exists a τD > 0 such that optimal internal ownership is less than
full (0 ≤ ω∗ < 1) if τD > τD.
Proof. (i) We first show that F ∗P = 0 when τP ≤ z and τD > 0. Let us denote with F 0P and
F 0S the optimal values of FP and FS absent IDT. Consider the K-T conditions (i) and (iv). It
can be proved that ∂
2∆C
∂FP ∂τD
< 0, ∂
2∆T
∂FP ∂τD
> 0, where the former is implied by convexity of the
objective function. Focusing on the l.h.s. of condition (i), it is easy to conclude that F ∗P ≤ F 0P
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when τD > 0. Indeed, the sum of the first two terms has to decrease to counterbalance the
increase in the last two terms, due to the increase in τD (which is stronger than the possible
decrease of the l.h.s. due to second order effects on Γ). Such reduction occurs together
with a reduction in the optimal FP , given the convexity of the stand-alone problem. When
F 0P = 0, F
∗
P = 0 as well, and both
∂∆C
∂FP
and ∂∆T
∂FP
are zero. A similar argument leads us to
conclude that F ∗S ≥ F 0S , focusing on condition (iv). Theorem 2 proves that F 0P = 0 if τP ≤ z.
It follows that F ∗P = F
0
P = 0 when τP ≤ z.
Now we can prove that ω∗ = 0 when τD > 0. Suppose to the contrary that ω∗ > 0.
Then, default costs and taxes in the parent, as well as in the subsidiary, are unchanged
with respect to the ω∗ = 0 case. However, intercorporate dividend taxes and, as a conse-
quence, ∆T , are positive, thereby reducing value. Hence, ω∗ = 0 is the only feasible solution.
(ii) Recall that, according to part (ii) of Theorem 2, τP ≥ z′ implies positive optimal
parent debt, F 0P > 0. Let us now consider an increase in τD. It is possible that F
∗
P = 0. In
such case, part (i) of the theorem applies, and hence ω∗ = 0 < 1. Otherwise, F ∗P > 0. In
such case, solutions with ω∗ = 1 exist when condition (viii), evaluated at ω∗ = 1, is satisfied.
Such condition is
− ∂∆C
∂ω
(τD, F
∗
P , F
∗
S) +
∂∆T
∂ω
(τD, F
∗
P , F
∗
S) = µ3, (B.14)
with µ3 ≤ 0. Thus, ω∗ < 1 if the l.h.s. of Eq. (B.14) is strictly positive. When τD → 0, the
first term of the sum on the l.h.s. of the equation is negative, and the second term disappears,
whereas when τD = 1, the first term goes to zero, while the second term is positive. With
the l.h.s. being continuous and increasing in τD because of convexity there exists a level of
τD, that we denote as τD above which there is no solution at ω
∗ = 1.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3. The condition for the existence of a pyramid
descends directly from part (ii) of the Lemma 2. A condition for the existence of horizontal
groups is a condition on τD such that ω
∗ = 0 is the only feasible solution. ω∗ = 0 implies
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µ4 ≥ 0, µ3 = 0 in Eq. (B.3). Condition (viii) in Eq. (B.3) when ω∗ → 0 reads
− ∂∆C
∂ω
(τD, F
∗
P , F
∗
S) +
+ φτD
∫ +∞
Xd∗S
(x(1− τS) + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S)f(x)dx = µ4, (B.15)
where we considered that the upper limit of integration,
XdP
ω(1−τD)(1−τS) + X
d
S, tends to +∞
when ω goes to zero, and we denoted with XZ∗i and X
d∗
i for i = P, S the tax shield and
default threshold, respectively, evaluated at the optimum. The l.h.s. of the above equation
is non-positive for τD = 0 and is increasing in τD, since its first derivative with respect to τD
is strictly positive. It follows that a necessary condition for the existence of a solution where
ω∗ = 0, for given F ∗S and F
∗
P , is that τD is higher than a certain level, which we define as τ¯D
that solves
−∂∆C
∂ω
(τD, F
∗
P , F
∗
S) + φτD
∫ +∞
Xd∗S
(x(1− τS) + τSXZ∗S − F ∗S)f(x)dx = 0, (B.16)
Also, recall that the l.h.s. of the Kuhn-Tucker condition (viii) is increasing in ω. Hence,
for every τD > τ¯D, ω
∗ = 0 is the only feasible solution, because ω∗ > 0 would contradict
condition (viii) that requires the l.h.s. to be lower than or equal to zero. Also, notice that
convexity of the objective function in ω also implies that τD ≤ τ¯D. Finally, value and default
costs neutrality under the conditions of the theorem follow directly from Lemma 2 part (i).
Proof of Theorem 4.
(i) A cap on subsidiary debt introduces a new constraint in the optimization program:
F ∗∗S ≤ K, where K is the imposed cap, and (F ∗∗P , F ∗∗S , ω∗∗) denotes the solution to such a
constrained program. We thus consider the set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions in Eq. (B.3) and
modify them appropriately:
(iv)′ :
∂TSSA(F
∗∗
S )
∂FS
+
∂CSSA(F
∗∗
S )
∂FS
− ∂Γ(F
∗∗
P , F
∗∗
S )
∂FS
− ∂∆C(F
∗∗
P , F
∗∗
S )
∂FS
+
∂∆T (F ∗∗P , F
∗∗
S )
∂FS
= µ2 − µ3,
(vii)′ : µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0
(xiv)′ : µ3(F ∗∗S −K) = 0.
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Let us consider the case in which the new constraint (xiv)’ is binding so that F ∗∗S = K,
and inspect the conditions ensuring zero parent debt. Hence, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 = 0, µ3 ≥ 0. We
focus on condition (i), and we refer the reader to the proof of Theorem 2 for the discussion
of other conditions. Condition (i), when F ∗∗P = 0 and F
∗∗
S = K, becomes
− τP (1−G(0))∂X
Z
P (0, K)
∂FP
− ∂X
Z
S (0, K)
∂FP
∫ +∞
XdS(0,K)
τSf(x)dx+
+ αSφ
∂XdP (0, K)
∂FP
[∫ XZS (0,K)
0
xg(x,
K
1− τ −
x
1− τ )dx+
+
∫ XdS(0,K)
XZS (0,K)
xg(x,XdS(0, K)− x)dx
]
= µ1. (B.17)
The first term on the l.h.s. is negative; the second is negative as well and increasing in K (as
XZS is increasing and convex in FP ), while the third one is null when K = 0 and is increasing
in K. It follows that condition (i) can be satisfied only for a K high enough. Because a
negative l.h.s. of Eq. (B.16) implies positive optimal parent leverage, a zero-leverage parent
is possible only if K > K¯, with K¯ solving the following equation and being the cap above
which the parent has zero optimal leverage:
αSφ
∂XdP (0, K¯)
∂FP
[∫ XZS (0,K¯)
0
xg(x,
K¯
1− τS −
x
1− τS )dx+
+
∫ XdS(0,K¯)
XZS (0,K¯)
xg(x,XdS(0, K¯)− x)dx
]
+
− ∂X
Z
S (0, K¯)
∂FP
∫ +∞
XdS(0,K¯)
τSf(x)dx
= µ1 + τP (1−G(0))∂X
Z
P (0, K¯)
∂FP
.
Hence, for every K < K¯, the parent has optimal positive leverage. Notice that the higher
αS the lower the required cap level K¯ that allows for the presence of a zero-leverage optimal
parent company, while, on the contrary, the higher τP the higher the required cap, because
the marginal gain from raising debt in the parent is higher. Considerations similar to the
unconstrained case apply to condition (iv)’, which is met at F ∗∗S = K by an appropriate
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choice of µ3. This concludes our proof of part (i).
(ii) The proof follows directly from Theorem 2 part (ii), whose proof relies on the parent
having positive leverage.
(iii) We discuss the first Kuhn-Tucker condition when FP = F
P∗
SA, FS = F
∗∗
S = K, as-
suming τD < τD. In this case, the only feasible solution implies ω
∗ = 1. Then, given our
convexity assumption, we can find a sufficient condition for F ∗∗P > F
P∗
SA:
(
− ∂Γ
∂FP
− ∂∆C
∂FP
+
∂∆T
∂FP
)
|FP=FP∗SA ,FS=F ∗∗S ,ω∗=1 < 0. (B.18)
This implies αP
αS
> C, where C is equal to
∂XdP
∂FP
[
XZS (K)∫
0
xg
(
x,XP,d∗SA +
K
1−τP − x1−τP
)
dx+
∫XdS(K)
XZS (K)
xg
(
x,XP,d∗SA +X
d
S(K)− x)dx
)]
∂∆C
∂FP
αP
, (B.19)
where all the derivatives involved are evaluated at (F P∗SA, K).
Proof of Theorem 5.
We know from Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that conditional guarantees are value in-
creasing. As a consequence, the value of the group structure, when there is a bailout guar-
antee and subsidiary debt is set equal to the optimal stand-alone level, is νPS(F
∗∗
P , F
S∗
SA) ≥
νSA(F
P∗
SA, F
S∗
SA), where νSA(F
S∗
SA, F
P∗
SA) = νPS(F
P∗
SA, F
S∗
SA,Γ = 0, ω = 0). We know, from the
previous considerations, that the first order conditions (f.o.c.) for a solution with F ∗∗P > 0
include
∂T PSA(F
∗∗
P )
∂FP
+
∂CPSA(F
∗∗
P )
∂FP
− ∂Γ(F
∗∗
P , F
S∗
SA)
∂FP
− ∂∆C(F
∗∗
P , F
S∗
SA)
∂FP
+
∂∆T (F ∗∗P , F
S∗
SA)
∂FP
= 0. (B.20)
The equivalent condition in the stand-alone case is
∂T PSA(F
P∗
SA)
∂FSA
+
∂CPSA(F
P∗
SA)
∂FSA
= 0. (B.21)
We also know that
∂Γ(F ∗∗P ,F
P∗
SA)
∂FP
≤ 0, since the guarantee is nonzero and more valuable the
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lower is FP . Also, when τD > τ¯D, ∆C = 0 and ∆T = 0 for all FP and FS, since ω
∗ = 0.
Since by assumption T PSA+C
P
SA is convex in the face value of debt, it follows that F
∗∗
P < F
P∗
SA.
As a consequence, it follows that the default costs of the group are lower than the ones of
two stand-alone units. Indeed
CP (F
∗∗
P ) + CS(F
∗∗
S ) = C
P
SA(F
∗∗
P ) + CSA(F
∗∗
S )− Γ(F ∗∗P , F ∗∗SA)−∆C(F ∗∗P , F ∗∗SA) =
= CPSA(F
∗∗
P ) + CSA(F
S∗
SA)− Γ(F ∗∗P , F S∗SA) < CPSA(F ∗∗P ) + CSA(F S∗SA) < CPSA(F P∗SA) + CSA(F S∗SA).
The last two inequalities hold because Γ(·, ·) is positive as soon as F ∗∗P > 0 and because
stand-alone default costs are increasing in the face value of debt, respectively.
49
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
References
Acharya, V. V., Gottschalg, O. F., Hahn, M., Kehoe, C., 2013. Corporate governance and
value creation: evidence from private equity. Review of Financial Studies 26, 368–402.
Almeida, H., Park, S. Y., Subrahmanyam, M. G., Wolfenzon, D., 2011. The structure and
formation of business groups: Evidence from korean chaebols. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 99, 447–475.
Almeida, H. V., Wolfenzon, D., 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business
groups. Journal of Finance 61, 2637–2680.
Altomonte, C., Rungi, A., 2013. Business groups as hierarchies of firms: determinants of ver-
tical integration and performance. Unpublished Working Paper, European Central Bank
.
Axelson, U., Stro¨mberg, P., Weisbach, M. S., 2009. Why are buyouts levered? the financial
structure of private equity funds. Journal of Finance 64, 1549–1582.
Barclay, M. J., Holderness, C. G., Sheehan, D. P., 2009. Dividends and corporate sharehold-
ers. Review of Financial Studies 22, 2423–2455.
Bernanke, B. S., Campbell, J. Y., Whited, T., 1990. US corporate leverage: Developments
in 1987 and 1988; comments and discussion. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity pp.
255–278.
Bianco, M., Nicodano, G., 2006. Pyramidal groups and debt. European Economic Review
50, 937–961.
Bloch, L., Kremp, E., 2001. Ownership and voting power in france. In: Barca, J., Becht, M.
(eds.), The control of corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, pp. 106–127.
Blouin, J., Huizinga, H., Laeven, M. L., Nicode`me, G., 2014. Thin capitalization rules and
multinational firm capital structure. Unpublished Working Paper, International Monetary
Fund.
50
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Bodie, Z., Merton, R., 1992. On the management of financial guarantees. Financial Manage-
ment pp. 87–109.
Boot, A. W., Greenbaum, S. I., Thakor, A. V., 1993. Reputation and discretion in financial
contracting. American Economic Review pp. 1165–1183.
Brok, P., 2018. Corporate structure, international tax spillovers, and capital structure. Un-
published Working Paper, Tilburg University .
Cestone, G., Fumagalli, C., Kramarz, F., Pica, G., 2017. Insurance between firms: The role
of internal labor markets. Unpublished working paper, Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for
Economic Research .
Chemmanur, T. J., John, K., 1996. Optimal incorporation, structure of debt contracts, and
limited-recourse project financing. Journal of Financial Intermediation 5, 372–408.
Chetty, R., Saez, E., 2010. Dividend and corporate taxation in an agency model of the firm.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, 1–31.
Cooper, M., McClelland, J., Pearce, J., Prisinzano, R., Sullivan, J., Yagan, D., Zidar, O.,
Zwick, E., 2016. Business in the United States: Who owns it, and how much tax do they
pay? Tax Policy and the Economy 30, 91–128.
Dahlquist, M., Robertsson, G., Rydqvist, K., 2014. Direct evidence of dividend tax clienteles.
Journal of Empirical Finance 28, 1–12.
De Jong, A., DeJong, D., Hege, U., Mertens, G., 2012. Blockholders and leverage: When debt
leads to higher dividends. Unpublished working paper, Rotterdam School of Management
.
DeAngelo, H., Masulis, R. W., 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal
taxation. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3–29.
DeMarzo, P., Duffie, D., 1999. A liquidity-based model of security design. Econometrica 67,
65–99.
51
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and conse-
quences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., Hines, J. R., 2004. A multinational perspective on capital structure
choice and internal capital markets. Journal of Finance 59, 2451–2487.
Faccio, M., Lang, L. H., 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations.
Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365–395.
Faulkender, M., Smith, J. M., 2016. Taxes and leverage at multinational corporations. Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 122, 1–20.
Fulghieri, P., Sevilir, M., 2011. Mergers, spinoffs, and employee incentives. Review of Finan-
cial Studies 24, 2207–2241.
Gorton, G. B., Souleles, N. S., 2007. Special purpose vehicles and securitization. In: Stulz,
R., Carey, M. (eds.), The risks of financial institutions , University of Chicago Press, pp.
549–602.
Graham, J. R., Tucker, A. L., 2006. Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of
Financial Economics 81, 563–594.
Guo, S., Hotchkiss, E. S., Song, W., 2011. Do buyouts (still) create value? Journal of Finance
66, 479–517.
Han, J., Park, K., Pennacchi, G., 2015. Corporate taxes and securitization. Journal of Fi-
nance 70, 1287–1321.
Herring, R., Carmassi, J., 2009. The corporate structure of international financial conglomer-
ates: complexity and its implications for safety and soundness. In: Berger, A., Molyneux,
P., Wilson, J. (eds.), The Oxford handbook of banking , Oxford University Press Oxford,
pp. 173–204.
Huizinga, H., Laeven, L., Nicode`me, G., 2008. Capital structure and international debt
shifting. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 80–118.
52
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Kandel, E., Kosenko, K., Morck, R., Yafeh, Y., 2015. The great pyramids of america: A
revised history of US business groups, corporate ownership and regulation, 1930–1950.
Unpublished Working paper, European Corporate Governance Institute .
Kaplan, S., 1989. Management buyouts: Evidence on taxes as a source of value. Journal of
Finance 44, 611–632.
Kim, W., Lim, Y., Sung, T., 2007. Group control motive as a determinant of ownership
structure in business conglomerates: Evidence from koreas chaebols. Pacific-Basin Finance
Journal 15, 213–252.
Kolasinski, A. C., 2009. Subsidiary debt, capital structure and internal capital markets.
Journal of Financial Economics 94, 327–343.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world.
Journal of Finance 54, 471–517.
Leland, H. E., 2007. Financial synergies and the optimal scope of the firm: Implications for
mergers, spinoffs, and structured finance. Journal of Finance 62, 765–807.
Lewellen, K., Robinson, L. A., 2013. Internal ownership structures of US multinational firms.
Unpublished Working paper, Dartmouth College .
Luciano, E., Nicodano, G., 2014. Guarantees, leverage, and taxes. Review of Financial Stud-
ies 27, 2736–2772.
Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., Zein, J., 2011. Family business groups around the world:
Financing advantages, control motivations, and organizational choices. Review of Financial
Studies 24, 3556–3600.
Matvos, G., Seru, A., 2014. Resource allocation within firms and financial market dislocation:
Evidence from diversified conglomerates. Review of Financial Studies 27, 1143–1189.
Morck, R., 2005. How to eliminate pyramidal business groups: the double taxation of inter-
corporate dividends and other incisive uses of tax policy. Tax Policy and the Economy 19,
135–179.
53
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016. Limiting base erosion in-
volving interest deductions and other financial payments, Action 4. 2016 Update: Inclusive
Framework on BEPS. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris .
Peaslee, J. M., Nirenberg, D. Z., 2001. Federal Income Taxation of Securitization Transac-
tions. Frank J. Fabozzi Associates, New Hope.
Penati, A., Zingales, L., 1997. Efficiency and distribution in financial restructuring: the case
of the Ferruzzi Group. Unpublished working paper, University of Chicago .
Scholes, M. S., Wilson, G. P., Wolfson, M. A., 1990. Tax planning, regulatory capital plan-
ning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks. Review of Financial Studies
3, 625–650.
Segura, A., 2018. Why did sponsor banks rescue their SIVs? a signaling model of rescues.
Review of Finance 22, 661–697.
Stein, J. C., 1997. Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources.
Journal of Finance 52, 111–133.
Strebulaev, I. A., Yang, B., 2013. The mystery of zero-leverage firms. Journal of Financial
Economics 109, 1–23.
Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2009. How are US family firms controlled? Review of Financial
Studies 22, 3047–3091.
Zingales, L., 1995. Insider ownership and the decision to go public. Review of Economic
Studies 62, 425–448.
54
